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 The thesis that you are now reading is substantially different from the one that I 
set out to write a year ago.  I originally wanted to write about European integration.  I, 
like many idealists before me, thought of regional political integration as the next step in 
the progression of civilization.  I viewed the European Union as the first (relatively) 
successful experiment toward that end and wanted to conduct a study that would 
explore the problems associated with nations sacrificing their sovereignty and national 
identities in the name of integration, with the hope of exploring how those problems 
have been overcome in the past.   
Great Britain, as one of the European Union’s most prominent-yet-ambivalent 
members, jumped out to me as the perfect potential case study.  I was fascinated by 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s attempt to convince Britons that joining with Europe 
was the right decision, by his potential kamikaze tactic of letting Britons decide for 
themselves in the country’s first-ever national referendum in 1975, and by their ultimate 
decision to stay in Europe despite decades of widespread resistance.  Britain’s 
relationship with Europe was by no means smooth sailing after that; its refusal to be a 
part of the Eurozone was the most prominent example of British ambivalence.  
Nevertheless, the fact was that in 1975 Britons were given the choice to leave the 
European Community - something that they had largely been clamoring for since they 
joined – and they turned it down.  I wanted to understand why, and I hoped to 
illuminate the issue by contrasting it with Wilson’s earlier failed attempt at convincing 
Britons that their future was with Europe in 1967.  As such, the basic structure of this 
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thesis was decided from the beginning, but due in large part to the events of the past 
year its purpose has significantly changed. 
At almost the very moment that I began researching this thesis, rumblings began 
to emerge about out-of-control debt in Greece and elsewhere in Europe.  Over the next 
few months, the Eurozone crisis exploded.  Old wounds were reopened.  The British 
press was full of stories denouncing the European Union – both the irresponsible 
practices that led to the crisis and the new austerity measures being proposed by 
Germany in exchange for financial support.  As I researched Britain’s public debates 
over Europe in 1967 and 1975, I was struck by how similar the discourse was between 
then and now.  My time researching in London in January 2012 reinforced this opinion.  
When mentioning to someone what I was researching, I was almost always met with an 
incensed “I’ll tell you what we think about the EU…”  The subsequent reviews were 
rarely glowing, and mirrored the language used in 1967 and 1975 to a startling degree.  
The issues that I was researching were still alive and well.  It seemed that little had 
changed since 1967 in the way that Britons thought about Europe. 
Around that time, I realized that when I set out to write this thesis I had started 
with the wrong question.  Before asking “why do states integrate,” I first had to 
understand national identity.  How are national identities formed?  How are they 
shifted?  Once set, can they ever really be changed?  What is the role of history in that 
process?  The following pages represent my attempt to grapple with those questions. 
This thesis owes a great debt to many people in my life.  The first and most 
important group must be my family and friends.  I would be lost without the support 
and love that they provide.  I am particularly indebted to my older sister Katie.  I never 
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would have learned to push myself if I had not been constantly driven to compete with 
her brilliance throughout my childhood, and as an adult I count her as one of my dearest 
friends.  She is also now a doctor, which is neither here nor there, but I enjoy bragging 
about it.  Thanks as well to my housemate and good friend Joe Leffler, a fellow history 
thesis writer.  As comrades-in-arms, we bounced ideas off each other until there were no 
more to bounce. 
I owe my deepest thanks to Leonard V. Smith, my advisor and mentor 
throughout this process.  His guidance, his support, his feedback, his high standards, 
and his willingness to challenge my ideas and point me in different directions with a 
smile on his face have all been invaluable to this project and to my wider life.  It has 
been an absolute privilege to work with him.  Finally, thank you to Renee Romano, 
whose Historical Memory course sparked a passion and shaped many of the ideas in this 
thesis, and whose Honors seminar (and its accompanying baked goods) kept me and 














Great Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role. 
















“One Tiny, Damp Little Island” 
Poor loves.  Trained to Empire, trained to rule the waves.  All gone.  All taken away.  
Bye-bye, world. 
-John Le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, 1974 
___________________________________ 
 
 Beginning with the massive success of From Russia with Love, published in 1957, 
Ian Fleming became Britain’s premiere adventure novelist.  His hero, James Bond, 
captured the British imagination by offering what historian David Cannadine called a 
cocktail of “great-power nostalgia, imperial escapism and national reassurance” at a 
time when British power was on the decline.1  In Fleming’s novels, the endlessly capable 
Bond made a career out of upstaging the blustering Americans, represented by Bond’s 
counterpart Felix Leiter.  Bond – and by extension Great Britain – kept the West 
together in secret while the Americans did all the talking.2  This escapist fantasy acted as 
a tonic to the British nation which, in the wake of World War II, saw its empire begin to 
crumble, its economy falter, and its national pride erode.  Countless Britons indulged in 
this fantasy, and for many it was no fantasy at all; to them, Britain still was a great 
power, waiting in the wings for a moment of national renewal.  The Bond narrative, 
however, was not without its alternatives. 
 By the 1970s, former intelligence officer John Le Carré had displaced Ian Fleming 
as Britain’s premiere spy novelist.  Where Fleming’s world was a projected fantasy of 
continued British global relevance, Le Carré’s characters represented a generation of 
                                                          
1 David Cannadine, In Churchill’s Shadow: Confronting the Past in Modern Britain, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), p. 281 
2 ibid, p. 304 
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individuals becoming disillusioned with that same fantasy.  At the height of his 
popularity, beginning with 1963’s The Spy Who Came in from the Cold and culminating 
in the 1974 release of Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, Le Carré wrote a series of novels that 
featured members of the World War II generation coming to terms with Britain’s 
declining world role and accompanying moral decay.  Britons were raised to believe that 
they occupied a special place in the world because their Empire occupied a special place 
in the world; if the latter were no longer true, neither was the former.  What, Le Carré 
asked, did it mean to be a Briton in an era when the traditional conception of British 
identity was gone?  That question tore apart Le Carré’s characters.  Some committed 
suicide; some became Soviet spies; some plugged away at meaningless bureaucratic 
desk jobs and led unfulfilled lives.  All of them served to illustrate the dangers that faced 
Britain if its national identity remained stuck in the past.   
The progression from Fleming to Le Carré as Britain’s novelist du jour accurately 
reflected the shift in the way that Britons viewed themselves which took place during the 
1960s and 1970s.  From the end of World War II until the 1970s, Winston Churchill’s 
narrative of World War II as Britain’s “Finest Hour” dominated British national identity.  
The narrative argued that by standing up to Hitler when the rest of Europe fell, Britons 
reasserted that they were a unique people with a history of greatness, even if they lost 
their empire.  If they continued to keep calm and carry on, as the iconic posters that 
peppered London during the blitz advised, they would persevere over any challenge.  
Unfortunately for Britons, time proved this narrative to be divorced from reality.  By 
embracing a national identity that emphasized going it alone – a national identity in 
denial of the realities of the present – Britain risked dooming itself to true international 
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irrelevance.  Keeping calm and carrying on had achieved Britons nothing in the past two 
decades.  By the 1970s they were ready for something new. 
This work examines the moment that Britons – political leaders and common 
citizens alike – finally undertook the painful process of forging a new national identity 
to fit a changed world.  The event that forced this shift in identity was the British 
application for entry into the European Economic Community (EEC).  Often referred to 
in Britain as the Common Market, the EEC was at its heart a free trade zone in Western 
Europe that sought to build up Europe as a financially independent bloc of countries 
that could act as a counterweight to the bipolar Cold War world order dominated by the 
United States in the West and the Soviet Union in the East.  Though it was primarily an 
economic arrangement in the 1960s and 1970s, from the outset its founders envisioned 
it as laying the groundwork for a lasting political union in Western Europe.  This, more 
than its economic policies, was Britain’s primary objection to the EEC in the 
organization’s early years. 
 Britain’s process of joining the EEC was long and contentious.  The UK first 
applied to the EEC under Harold MacMillan’s Conservative Party government in 1963.  
However, France’s nationalistic President Charles DeGaulle, convinced that Britain was 
a puppet of the United States and would therefore undermine the intended 
independence of the EEC, vetoed British entry.  This turn of events was much to the 
relief of most of the British public.  EEC entry was viewed as a betrayal of all that was 
British – the sovereignty of the Queen in Parliament and the independence of Britain as 
a politically and culturally separate entity from continental Europe. 
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In 1967, Britain applied to the EEC again under the Labour government of 
Harold Wilson.  This time, however, the debate was different.  That is to say, there was a 
debate.  Public resistance to joining the EEC was still widespread, and was even more 
ferocious than before.  The notion of joining the EEC fundamentally challenged nearly 
every aspect of the makeshift national identity to which Britons had been clinging since 
the end of World War II.  Nevertheless, there were a great many voices in support of the 
EEC as well.  For the moment it did not matter, as De Gaulle again vetoed Britain’s 
application.  Britain finally entered the EEC in 1972 – after both De Gaulle and Wilson  
were no longer in power – under the leadership of the Conservative Prime Minister 
Edward Heath.  The legwork, however, had been done under Wilson. 
 Then in 1975, Harold Wilson, back in office as Prime Minister, held the first 
public referendum in British history.  The question: should the United Kingdom remain 
in the EEC under renegotiated terms?  The referendum, although constitutionally non-
binding in the UK where sovereignty lies not with the public but with Parliament, was a 
material manifestation of Wilson’s argument it was ultimately up to the British public to 
decide what sort of nation Britain would become.  The real question at the heart of the 
1975 referendum was much broader than contention over a trade agreement.  It was 
more important than Britain’s traditions and institutions.  The referendum asked: 
“What is Britain?  Is it the same nation that it has always been, or could it finally become 
something new?”  In 1975 the British public overwhelmingly voted in favor of something 
new.  By a majority of 67.2%, they voted to stay in the EEC. 
 In examining the shift in British identity that was revealed by the EEC debates of 
the 1960s and 1970s, this thesis will take snapshots of the two most revealing moments 
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of that process: the 1967 public debate and the 1975 referendum.  The 1967 debate was 
the point at which Britain’s “Finest Hour” identity was challenged most directly and 
fought back the hardest.  As such, it serves as a perfect window into the nature of that 
identity at its highest tide.  The 1975 debate was the counter-point, the moment when 
the old identity was definitively cast aside in favor of a new identity closer to Europe, 
albeit only for that moment.  Together, these two debates served to bookend Britain’s 
identity crisis.  By analyzing only these two moments rather than presenting a narrative 
that links them together, this thesis hopes to emphasize how sharply they contrast.  It 
can be viewed as a comparison between two case studies: one in which an old national 
identity was held in place by the weight of history despite a direct challenge, and one in 
which the same national identity was successfully challenged by the adoption of a new 
historical narrative. 
 As Prime Minister, Harold Wilson was the instigator of both of these moments 
and played a key role in enabling and encouraging a shift in British national identity.  
Though his decision to bring Britain into the European Community was based on a 
pragmatic economic calculus, and though he embraced the 1975 referendum as a means 
of controlling his own party, once Wilson made up his mind about something he 
committed absolutely.  To convince Britons that joining the EEC was the best option for 
their future, in 1967 he promoted a narrative of British history that contradicted 
Churchill’s.  Churchill’s vision of British history – the one that was entrenched in British 
culture by the 1960s – saw Britain as a unique land apart, having more in common with 
other English-speaking nations than with the fratricidal Europeans that Britain saved 
from endless infighting time and again.  Wilson’s narrative was quite different.  oro him, 
12 
 
British history was a forward progression from chaos to ever-expanding order.  Tribes 
were replaced by clans, clans by kingdoms, and kingdoms by the United Kingdom.  
Joining with Europe was simply the next stage in that inevitable evolution.  As such, 
Wilson’s desire to bring Britain into Europe was driven by hard statistics, but his 
argument to the public involved a broad rewrite of British history and a call for a new 
national identity. 
 Similarly, Wilson’s decision to embrace the 1975 referendum began as a political 
tactic to keep his party in line, but became a complete reconceptualization of Britons’ 
relationship to their government.  In Britain, sovereignty lies with Parliament; the 
public’s only official role is to routinely elect the members of the House of Commons.  As 
Walter Bagehot argued in his influential work The English Constitution, this unique 
form of government was a result of the particular vicissitudes of British history.  
Bagehot posited that the endurance of Britain’s Parliamentary system can be traced to 
the fact that Britons never stopped viewing the Sovereign as the uniting heart of their 
nation coupled with a contradictory desire for a more republican government.  Thus, 
“the appendages of a monarchy have been converted into the essence of a republic; only 
[in Britain], because of a more numerous heterogeneous political population, it is 
needful to keep the ancient show while we secretly interpolate the new reality.”3  A key 
part of this balancing act is maintaining the tradition that Parliament is elected by the 
people, but once elected acts with absolute sovereignty.  This allows Parliament to make 
unpopular decisions – and risk dissolution – while the Sovereign remains above the fray 
and maintains his/her purity as a unifying symbol. 
                                                          
3 Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, (Second Edition, 1873), p. 209-210 
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Wilson did not formally set out to change this; rather, he argued to all who would 
listen that the results of the 1975 referendum might not be legally binding on 
Parliament, but that Parliament had to abide by them anyway.  The referendum needed 
no formal constitutional revision to be binding.  It represented the will of the people, 
and the will of the people must come first, regardless of centuries of storied tradition 
and regardless of the letter of the law.  This was a source of major debate in Britain, a 
nation that takes tradition very seriously.  Wilson’s argument, however, gave Britons an 
unprecedented level of direct ownership over their nation and its future.  Wilson 
empowered Britons to take their history into their own hands and use it to decide what 
their nation could be by asserting that Parliamentary Sovereignty was a bluff; that 
despite tradition, the spirit of Britain had always lived in the people and Britain’s future 
was theirs to guide. 
 This thesis argues that a nation’s identity creates the framework and parameters 
in which it can act, that its identity is powerfully shaped by its history, and therefore that 
history exerts a substantial, concrete force on the present.  The past is not merely a 
backdrop or a tool to be used by canny politicians; it is an independent actor that can be 
difficult to overcome.  It frames the discursive choices available to a population.  In 
Britain, history stood as a major impediment to the British attempt at finding a new 
place in the world when its old place was lost.  After a long, painful struggle, however, 
Britons were able to resist its pull and turn toward the future, if only for a moment.  
They did so not by rejecting their history, but by reframing and marshaling it in order to 
create a new narrative and thus a new national identity.  History is sometimes a 
roadblock and sometimes a tool, but it is always at the heart of national identity. 
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British National Identity 
From the birth of Great Britain in 1707 until World War II, Britain’s national 
identity was rooted in the twin pillars of the British Empire and separation from Europe.  
In Britons, the definitive study of British national identity in the age of empire, historian 
Linda Colley argues that the Empire left such a lasting mark on the British psyche 
because it provided material proof of what Britons viewed as their preordained destiny: 
to lead the world into an age of enlightened civilization.4  Britons viewed themselves as 
chosen by God for this task, and the Empire was their proof.  Thus, the existence of the 
Empire became closely knit with British pride.  If the Empire was the proof of Britain’s 
God-given greatness, Britons would lose their greatness should the Empire ever cease to 
exist. 
The other key to traditional British national identity was that it stood in 
opposition to what Britons saw as a European – and particularly a French – identity.  
Identities must always be to some extent oppositional; for there to be an in-group, there 
must be an out-group.  As Colley notes, “imagining the French as their vile opposites, as 
Hyde to their Jekyll, became a way for Britons… to contrive for themselves a converse 
and flattering identity.”5  France was Catholic, so Britain took pride in its Protestantism; 
France had an absolutist monarchy, so Britain reveled in its constitutional monarchy.  
This oppositional identity even extended to the form of Britain’s empire.  Britons felt 
that their “Empire of the Deep,” a phrase coined by the Scottish poet James Thomson, 
was more civilized and thus morally superior to the traditional land empires of 
                                                          




continental Europe.6  These two pillars – the Empire and separation from Europe – 
defined the British nation for centuries, but they could not last forever.  Though Britain 
escaped from World War II physically unscathed compared to the rest of Europe, the 
war was not so merciful to British national identity. 
The United Kingdom’s total war against Nazi Germany marked the British 
Empire’s final stand.  To some extent, World War II was a war of choice for the UK.  
Hitler held the Anglo-Saxon race in high esteem and sought to coexist with Britain, not 
conquer it.  The British Empire could likely have endured for some time longer if it had 
decided to play along with Nazi Germany.  It was a genuine and tempting option, but 
Britain turned it down.  As A. J. P. Taylor remarked in English History 1914-1945, the 
decision to replace Neville Chamberlain with Winston Churchill in 1940 signified the 
government’s conscious decision to defeat Hitler at any cost to Britain.  “Victory,” Taylor 
writes, “even if this meant placing the British empire in pawn to the United States; 
victory, even if it meant Soviet domination of Europe; victory at all costs.”7  Britain, 
then, was willing to bargain its empire - its function in the world and thus its very 
identity - in exchange for defeating Germany.  It got exactly what it bargained for. 
 Rather than embrace the opportunities of an unknown future, in the wake of the 
war Britons filled the void left by the loss of their Empire with a new myth.  The “Finest 
Hour” myth of World War II, rooted in the rhetoric of Winston Churchill, loomed large 
in the British imagination.  The myth still holds power to this day, though less than it 
did in the two decades after the war.  In fact, it may have been most purely expressed as 
                                                          
6 Stephen H. Gregg (ed.), Empire and Identity: An Eighteenth-Century Sourcebook, (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2005), p. 7 
7 A. J. P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 475 
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recently as 2005 in an episode of the British pop-cultural institution Doctor Who.  
Visiting London during the Blitz, the Doctor – a time-travelling alien with a distinctly 
British spirit – rhapsodizes: 
Amazing…  1941.  Right now, not very far from here, the German war machine is rolling 
up the map of Europe.  Country after country, falling like dominoes.  Nothing can stop it.  
Nothing!  Until one tiny, damp little island says, “No!  No.  Not here.”  A mouse in front 
of a lion.  You’re amazing.  The lot of you.  Don’t know what you do to Hitler, but you 
frighten the hell out of me.8 
 
In redefining their nation as the mouse that defeated the lion, a complete reversal of 
Britain’s representation during the age of the Empire, Britons were able to maintain 
their belief in the supremacy of the United Kingdom despite a broken empire and 
waning international influence.  They replaced the sprawl of the Empire with a fierce 
pride in their tiny island that stood tall where larger nations fell.  The sun may finally 
have set on the British Empire, but if Britons’ stiff upper lip saw them through the fury 
of Hitler, it could similarly see them through any trial.  Britons became convinced of 
their self-reliance and wary of tying themselves to any foreign nation or international 
organization that they did not absolutely control.  The “Finest Hour” myth effectively 
gave Britons a reprieve from having to grapple with the hard question of determining 
who they would be in a post-Empire world and compelled them to prove their 
continuing independence.   
Their primary tool in this endeavor was the Commonwealth.  Britain’s trade was 
by choice dependent on the Commonwealth states – a collection of former colonies that 
still maintained a free association under the Crown.  The Commonwealth was born out 
of a desire to accommodate colonial calls for independence and international pressure 
                                                          
8 Stephen Moffat, Doctor Who, “The Empty Child,” 2005 
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to end colonial practices without losing the material benefits of the Empire or the sense 
of fraternity that Britons felt toward the residents of their former colonies.  Britain 
granted the Commonwealth states independence in exchange for continued symbolic 
ties and – more importantly – privileged trade agreements.  Of these states, Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa were most important to the British economy. 
The Commonwealth states, however, were growing less dependent on Britain by 
the year.  Independently, they all began to realize that trade with the world’s growing 
economies – particularly the United States, Germany, and Japan – was too lucrative to 
turn down.  They opened their markets to more non-British goods and decreased the 
proportion of their exports that went to Britain.9  Britain’s primary export market was 
shrinking fast, and it did not aggressively pursue new markets to compensate.  Britain 
was failing, and it would continue on its downward spiral as long as it remained 
convinced that it could go it alone.   
The EEC was the primary alternative to continued reliance on the 
Commonwealth, but by joining with Europe Britain would be destroying the only pillar 
of its national identity that still stood.  After the loss of the Empire, Britain’s cultural 
separation from the rest of Europe was as important to its national identity as ever.  For 
Britons clinging to the myth of their global uniqueness, it was all they had left.  World 
War II further reinforced this narrative by convincing Britons that they had saved 
Europe from Hitler, and therefore that the Continent was in Britain’s debt.  As such, the 
notion of joining the EEC was tantamount to destroying the last tenet of traditional 
British national identity.  Without the EEC, however, Britain’s future looked bleak. 
                                                          
9 William I. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe, (New York: Anchor Books, 2003), p. 223 
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At this historic juncture, with Britons coming to terms with an old identity lost 
but fighting against the only plausible vision of their future tooth and nail, I begin this 
thesis.  
Historiographical Discussion 
British political history is traditionally biographical, and as such usually reflects 
some variation of the “Great Man” theory of history.  Even the broad surveys, such as A. 
J. P. Taylor’s above-mentioned English History 1914-1945, are generally framed as the 
story of a series of great individuals and the ways in which they shaped Britain.  In these 
accounts, social forces and national identity are subservient to the men, and 
occasionally the women, who wielded them.  There is a healthy body of British social 
and cultural history, but it is kept in a separate sphere from the political.  The two are 
rarely allowed to interact or inform one another in British historiography. 
Studies that focus on Britain’s entry into the EEC follow this trend.  Most of the 
scholarship on this period comes from two authors: Helen Parr and Melissa Pine.  
Melissa Pine’s work Harold Wilson and Europe begins with De Gaulle’s veto of Britain’s 
1967 EEC application and argues that Wilson should be credited with laying the 
groundwork for Britain’s successful bid in 1972, though it took place during MacMillan’s 
premiership.  Helen Parr’s book Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community 
more directly overlaps with the first half of this study.  It focuses on Wilson’s dealings 
with his Cabinet and the European leaders – particularly De Gaulle – from 1964 to 1967 
and argues that Wilson supported the EEC out of a genuine belief in its ideals, not a sly 
political calculus as is often argued.  These two authors came together to write an essay 
in The Labour Governments 1964-1970 called “Policy Towards the European Economic 
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Community,” which acts as a summary and synthesis of their books.  The works of Pine 
and Parr have two primary items on their agenda: they establish a detailed chronology 
of events at the highest level of government, and they seek to intervene in Harold 
Wilson’s reputation by showing him to be as dedicated an idealist as he was a canny 
politician.  These are valid concerns, but they have already been addressed and as such 
will not play a major role here. 
Rather, this thesis aims to complicate the story of British political history by 
adding in issues of national identity, historical memory, and public opinion.  Wilson’s 
actions will be equally balanced with the words of average Britons in order to show the 
discourse between the halls of power and the politics of the people.  National identity 
constrains the choices available to policymakers, and though elites can influence that 
identity, it ultimately lives in the public.  Politics informs public perception, and public 
perception shapes politics.  This thesis shows by example that to tell the history of one 
without the other is to tell an incomplete story. 
Methodology 
 In researching this study, I relied on two bodies of primary sources in addition to 
secondary studies and the memoirs of Harold Wilson.  The first of these is the vast 
quantity of British governmental records available to the public.  The Hansard Project 
collects Parliamentary papers and complete transcripts of every Parliamentary debate 
from 1803 to 2005.  The British National Archives publishes the Cabinet Papers of the 
government as they are declassified, which by law is thirty years after they were created.  
All of these sources have been consulted in compiling this thesis. 
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The second body of sources used – representing the bulk of this study’s original 
research – is a collection of regional newspapers from throughout Great Britain.  This 
thesis uses the “Letters to the Editor” sections of these papers as a window into the 
public debate surrounding the EEC in Britain.  Historians constantly struggle with 
accurately assessing the views of the majority of people who do not control the historical 
narrative.  In more modern times the printing press, and now the internet, have made it 
easier for non-elites to record, distribute, and preserve their words.  That said, tuning 
into the voice of the street is still a challenge.  Newspapers that publish letters to the 
editor are one of the only sources in which the original words of common Britons are 
preserved in a large volume.  As such, this thesis uses them as its primary tool for 
tapping into public discourse. 
The newspapers examined in this thesis were carefully selected in order to 
provide a wide range of public opinion.  They were chosen according to two criteria: 
geographic variance and political orientation.  They represent a sampling of regions 
from around the United Kingdom and include papers aligned with various points on the 
political spectrum in order to account for editorial bias in which letters were selected for 
publication in various papers.10 
Thesis Structure 
 This thesis begins by exploring Harold Wilson’s shift in opinion on the EEC 
during his first three years as Prime Minister (1964-1967).  It argues that Wilson’s 
                                                          
10 The following newspapers were primarily used:  The Birmingham Post (serving the West Midlands 
area, free market orientation); The Bristol Evening Post (serving Greater Bristol, Northern Somerset, and 
South Gloucestershire, centrist/independent orientation); The Express & Star (serving Wolverhampton 
and the Black Country, Liberal orientation); The Liverpool Daily Post (serving Liverpool, Merseyside, 
Cheshire, and North Wales, center-left orientation); and the Manchester Evening News (serving Greater 
Manchester, leftist orientation). 
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reversal, from opponent of the EEC to its greatest champion, was the result of a 
pragmatic economic calculus, but that his public argument for EEC membership was 
rooted in British history and national identity.  This reflected his deep understanding of 
how the public would view the EEC as a challenge to British identity, though he himself 
viewed the issue in economic terms.  Wilson sought to steer Britain toward a new 
identity as the industrial and technological heart of an integrated Europe.  The British 
public, however, was not yet ready to follow him down that path. 
 From there it examines the 1967 EEC debate in public discourse.  It uses the 
words of common Britons to construct a snapshot of Britain’s “Finest Hour” ideology at 
the height of its influence and argues that Britain’s World War II identity suffered a 
Pyrrhic victory in 1967.  It held strong in the face of an event that undermined its 
primary tenets – the application the EEC – but would never again possess the iron grip 
that it once held over British society. 
 It next jumps forward to 1975 and focuses on the process that led to the 1975 
national referendum on remaining in the EEC.  Here it argues that Wilson consented to 
the referendum in order to control his rebellious party, but that once the referendum 
was underway he embraced it as an assertion of the will of the people over 
Parliamentary Sovereignty.  Thus, the referendum was framed as the moment in which 
Britons were finally forced to conclusively decide on a new direction and a new identity. 
 Finally, it returns to the public discourse, but finds that in 1975 Britons had 
largely shaken off the constraints of the “Finest Hour” narrative and were prepared to 
step into an unknown future.  The same anti-EEC arguments from 1967 were once again 
rallied, but this time there were counter-arguments that revealed Britons writing a new 
22 
 
narrative of their history.  By marshaling their history, Britons forged an alternate 
national identity. 
_________________________________ 
 This thesis does not argue that British identity forever purged itself of the scars of 
World War II in 1975 or that it permanently shifted toward Europe.  Recent events in 
the European Union – and current British public opinion about that troubled institution 
– clearly show otherwise.  Rather, in contrasting the 1967 EEC debate with the 1975 
referendum, I aim to demonstrate that though casting off the relentless weight of history 
is an excruciating process for a nation to undertake, and though it may not last for long, 
it is possible.  National identities are not set in stone.  They change, and they can be 




The Two Wilsons: Harold Wilson and the 1967 EEC Application 
We are not entitled to sell our friends and kinsmen down the river for a problematical and 
marginal advantage in selling washing machines in Dusseldorf.   
-Harold Wilson, August 3, 19611 
…if the nineteenth century, the age of nationalism, the age of European liberalism, was 
illuminated by the heroism and statesmanship which created those great nation States, the 
twentieth century equally can go down in history as the age in which men had the vision, out 
of those nation States, out of the destruction of two world wars which themselves arose from 
conflicts of European nationalism, to create a new unity. 
-Harold Wilson, May 8, 19672 
__________________________________ 
 Between 1961 and 1967, Harold Wilson transformed from a strong opponent of 
the European Community into a Prime Minister who used the full weight of his title and 
political prowess to persuade Parliament to apply for British entry into that same 
Community.  The two quotes above, separated by six years but both occurring in 
Parliamentary debates on the EEC, hold the key to understanding that transformation.  
In 1961, Wilson was droll and snappy.  In dismissing the EEC with a short punch line, 
his message was clear: “Britain does not need Europe.”  In 1967, however, the message 
and the tone were much different.  The EEC, previously equated with washing machines, 
was now the catalyst for transformative political change in Europe.  The tone shifted 
from down-to-earth, insular, and pithy to soaring, broad, and rather long-winded.3  
Taken together, those two quotes evince more than a simple change of heart on a policy 
issue; they indicate a calculated decision to change not just his conclusion, but the 
fundamental way that he talked about the EEC question.  This chapter explores that 
conversion and argues that it foreshadowed the shift in British identity that eventually 
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3 Though “long-winded” seems critical, Wilson would most likely agree.  He began that same speech by 
apologizing for its length and lamenting that it approaches “Gladstonian dimensions.” 
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asserted itself in the 1975 referendum.  Wilson’s shift, however, occurred well before 
Britain’s.  It began shortly after he ascended to Premiership in 1964. 
Harold Wilson 
 Harold Wilson was born in 1916 to a politically active lower middle-class family.  
His great-grandfather was a village cobbler, his grandfather was a Workhouse Master in 
York, and his father was an industrial chemist who witnessed the birth of the Labour 
Party in Manchester and voted for Labour in the party’s first major election in 1906; his 
mother was a schoolteacher.4  As such, Wilson’s family was middle-class but had deep 
roots in the working class.  This shaped his view of how British society should operate.  
In his memoirs, he wrote that his first experience in London – working as a research 
statistician in the Anglo-French Coordinating Committee in 1940 – made him 
uncomfortable.  “I had brought with me a healthy set of provincial prejudices that all the 
real work was done in places like Yorkshire… and that London was the Wen where the 
spivs were making all the profits at the workers’ expense,” Wilson wrote.5  He once 
claimed to have begun thinking like a Socialist at seven years of age and never stopped.6  
Wilson may have cultivated his image as a London outsider and a voice of the working 
class, but that image reflected his genuine view of Britain.  It was no mere political 
tactic.7 
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 Despite his lower middle-class roots, Wilson fought his way to a prestigious 
education on the merits of his intellectual prowess.  He attended Wirral Grammar 
School for Boys, a state-run grammar school, and served as Head Boy.  He excelled 
there, particularly at history.8  He received a county grant and an exhibition to study at 
Jesus College at Oxford, where he originally enrolled to study Modern History.  Mid-way 
through his education, however, he changed fields to Philosophy, Politics, and 
Economics.9  Wilson was known as a hard worker and a first-rate student, with one of 
his professors calling him “the most brilliant pupil he had ever encountered.”10  Though 
he was an Oxford student, the fact that he came to the school from a lower middle-class 
family without money or connections helped him to avoid being lumped in with the 
posh “Oxbridge” circle in the eyes of Britons. 
 Wilson’s experience in World War II established him as an experienced 
bureaucrat and a skilled statistician – two descriptors that came to define his political 
persona.  When the Second World War broke out, Wilson enlisted in the Armed Forces 
but was instead deemed a “specialist” and drafted into the Civil Service.  During the war 
he jumped between the Ministry of Supply, the economics section of the War Cabinet 
Secretariat, the Ministry of Labour, and the Ministry of Fuel and Power.11  At all of them, 
Wilson served as an economic advisor and statistician.  He played a key role in what 
Lord William Beveridge, the influential British economist (and Wilson’s mentor at 
Oxford) who formulated the post-war British welfare state, called “the Other War”: the 
mass mobilization of the home front in order to produce a dedicated wartime 
                                                          
8 Dudley Smith, p. 20 
9 ibid, p. 21 
10
 Gerard Eyre Noel, p. 38 
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economy.12  In these years, Wilson gained a reputation as a gifted economist with a mind 
for statistics and a clever tactician.  Having never served in the Armed Forces, however, 
Wilson did not gain the clout of the war hero that characterized many of his peers.  
Perhaps for this reason, he rarely evoked World War II as a political device while his 
rivals – largely veterans – mentioned it constantly.  He was seen as what modern 
political observers would call a technocrat - a brilliant, scientifically-minded specialist 
who was devoid of the burly charisma of someone like Winston Churchill.  He rose to 
prominence on the merits of his talent for micromanagement and his love of numbers, 
not his bravado. 
Shortly after the war, Wilson decided to leave the bureaucratic world behind and 
run for Parliament.  He was elected as Member of Parliament for Ormskirk in 1945 and 
quickly rose up the ranks of the Labour Party.  He became President of the Board of 
Trade at the age of 31, marking him as the youngest British Cabinet member in the 20th 
Century.  In 1963, Labour’s candidate for Prime Minister – Hugh Gaitskell – was 
unexpectedly killed by the vicious autoimmune disease Lupus, and Wilson became 
Labour’s new nominee after a chaotic four-way contest.  Wilson was thrust into the 
spotlight, where he remained until his retirement from politics.  His reputation as a 
technocrat, however, was cemented during World War II and never swayed.  That 
reputation was well-earned; his love for statistics and his cold pragmatism were always 
present in his political style, never more so than in his approach to the European 
Economic Community. 
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Wilson’s Economic Calculus (1961-66) 
 Until becoming Prime Minister, Harold Wilson viewed the EEC through an 
economic lens.  It would be a misleading simplification of Wilson’s position before 1964 
to argue that he was wholly opposed to Britain joining the EEC on principle; rather, he 
supported the EEC in principle, but remained opposed to joining due to the specifics of 
the EEC’s economic program.  At a Parliamentary debate in 1961, Wilson identified his 
primary objection to EEC membership as the damage that it would do to trade with the 
Commonwealth and with other countries outside the EEC.  He expressed specific 
concern over the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, meat and butter import agreements 
with New Zealand, and other “tropical agricultural products.”13  Britain’s EEC 
negotiators had thus far been unable to secure guarantees that the UK would be allowed 
to maintain these trade agreements after joining the EEC.  To Wilson, abandoning 
Commonwealth trade would be a double crime.  It would cripple the small 
Commonwealth nations that relied on Britain to absorb much of their exports – 
particularly New Zealand, which in 1965-66 sent 45% of its total exports to the UK.14  It 
would also damage Britain, which in 1960 was still selling about 30% of its exports to 
the Commonwealth and only 15.9% to Europe.15  Wilson felt that the numbers spoke for 
themselves.  Why abandon the larger trading bloc in favor of the smaller? 
 Even when opposed to joining the EEC, Wilson was entirely unmoved by the 
argument that the EEC would infringe on British sovereignty.  In fact, he welcomed such 
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15 William I. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe, (New York: Anchor Books, 2003), p. 233;  Report by 
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an eventuality.  “The whole history of political progress is a history of gradual 
abandonment of national sovereignty,” he told Parliament later in the same 1961 debate.  
“We abrogate it when we have a French referee at Twickenham.”16  Wilson deployed the 
same tactic here as in his “washing machines” comment: using a vivid folksy image to 
belittle his opponent’s position.  Here, however, he was aiming to nullify an argument 
made by his own side.  He was opposed to the EEC, but for specific economic reasons.  
He had no patience for broader political arguments. 
 Wilson’s laser-like focus on the economic aspects of the EEC speaks to the depth 
of his pragmatism.  Wilson was no ideologue.  He believed that history was moving in 
the direction of European – and eventually world – integration, but grand historical 
progress was less important to him than making sure that Britain could still import 
butter from New Zealand at low rates.  When taking this pragmatism into account, one 
is inclined to agree with English historian Helen Parr’s conclusion that Wilson’s position 
on the EEC never really changed.17  It was from the start attuned to an economically-
minded cost-benefit analysis.  When circumstances changed, Wilson’s analysis changed 
with it. 
 By the time that Wilson became Prime Minister, circumstances had indeed 
changed.  The EEC states were in the midst of a boom while Commonwealth trade was 
becoming less and less lucrative.  France and Germany in particular were experiencing 
economic growth at a rate that significantly outpaced Britain’s.  Between 1950 and 1960, 
France increased both its imports and exports threefold while Germany increased its 
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imports fourfold and its exports sixfold.18  Other indicators made clear that Europe 
showed no signs of slowing down.  For example, between 1960 and 1966, the number of 
automobiles in France doubled from 5.5 million to 11 million.19  Most important from 
Britain’s perspective, however, was how much of Europe’s success seemed to be due to 
the EEC.  Throughout the 1960s, just over a third of the EEC’s imports and exports were 
flowing between EEC member states.20  Such self-reliance had considerable appeal to 
Britain, an island country that was and is dependent on trade to survive.  The EEC was 
establishing a successful track record.  
 Meanwhile, British trade with the Commonwealth was waning – a fact that 
juxtaposed with success of the surging EEC.  By 1965, trade with the four most robust 
Commonwealth nations – Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Canada – had 
fallen to 18.7% of British exports.21  That same year, the six EEC states eclipsed the 
Commonwealth as the largest market for British goods.22  Commonwealth trade was not 
only losing ground in sheer volume; it was becoming far less lucrative.  Between 1955 
and 1965, trade with the Commonwealth grew at a dramatically slower rate than British 
trade with the rest of the world.  In that decade, the value of exports to the 
Commonwealth grew by 11.5% and imports grew by 10.5%.  In the same period, the 
value of British exports to the rest of the world grew by 93%, imports by 69%.23  
Furthermore, the Commonwealth nations were becoming progressively less reliant on 
the UK for trade.  Canada, for example, saw its trade with Japan quadruple and its trade 
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with Germany triple in the 1955-65 decade.  Its trade with the UK increased by only 
50%.24  By establishing closer commercial ties with other nations, the Commonwealth 
states were losing their incentive to give Britain such privileged trading status.  The 
system looked unsustainable. 
 In 1960, the UK helped establish the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) as 
an alternative to the EEC.  It was envisioned as a simple free trade area that would allow 
European states wary of the EEC’s implicit goal of eventual political unity to experience 
some of the same economic benefits of closer trading ties.  By 1967, the EFTA consisted 
of seven full members: the UK, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Portugal, and 
Austria.  The organization, however, was not as lucrative as the British government had 
hoped.  The EEC was fueled by the industrial might of Germany married with the 
agriculture of France.  Without any comparable powerhouses in its ranks, the EFTA 
never approached self-sufficiency. 
 Harold Wilson, stepping into this changing environment as Prime Minister, saw 
that Britain’s economy no longer stood on firm feet.  If Britain stubbornly maintained its 
current course, it would continue to slip into international irrelevance.  It needed a new 
trade foundation fit for the modern world.  Wilson’s cost/benefit analysis, unchanged in 
its parameters since before he took office, now swung in the direction of the need for a 
new economic arrangement and the EEC was the most obvious contender.  In deciding 
to explore the possibility of the EEC, however, Wilson was faced with a Cabinet, a Party, 
and a nation driven by much more than economic calculus.  What Wilson viewed as 
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economic, most Britons viewed as political.  If he wished to persuade his nation to join 
with Europe, he would have to adjust accordingly. 
The Two Wilsons (1966-67) 
Between 1965 and 1967, Harold Wilson committed himself and his government 
to make a second application to the European Economic Community, and in doing so 
discussed the EEC in terms of British identity for the first time.  There were, in effect, 
two Harold Wilsons.  The private Harold Wilson was concerned solely with the 
economic calculus of EEC membership.  This Wilson ordered the creation of a series of 
long, complex studies of the EEC.  One such study, marked SECRET GUARD and 
distributed to his Cabinet Ministers, was an elaborate 30-page analysis of possible 
alternatives to joining the EEC.  It identified two such possibilities: continued 
abstention from any global communities aside from the Commonwealth and the 
creation of an Atlantic Free Trade Area (AFTA). 
On the subject of abstention, the committee’s hopes were dim.  In the cover letter 
of the report, Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend summarized the committee’s jargon-filled 
findings in plainer language, contending that it would be impossible to maintain 
Britain’s current standard of living without entering the EEC.  “In form we might be 
more free,” he wrote, “but it would be a freedom to submit to disagreeable necessities.”25  
Joining the EEC, the report concluded, was Britain’s only avenue of maintaining 
international economic relevance.  
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AFTA was favored by British Ministers across the political spectrum for years, but 
was dismissed as a pipe dream by the interdepartmental committee tasked with 
assessing its viability.  A free trade agreement between the US and the UK, AFTA would 
have effectively moved the British Isles across the Atlantic and away from Europe.  The 
Cabinet report, however, concluded that it “could only come into being as a result of 
major changes in US policy, and perhaps only following US initiatives.”26  Trend’s cover 
letter was even more damning.  “There is no possibility of an AFTA coming into being 
with the world economic order as it is now,” he wrote.  “Decisions about future 
economic strategy for the United Kingdom must be taken in the context of what is 
possible now: and at present AFTA is not an ‘option’ open to the United Kingdom.”27  
Trend and the committee that wrote the report were aware of how important the EEC 
was to the United States’ vision of a unified Europe as a bolster against communist 
spread.  The EEC was seen in the US as one of the most important engines behind 
European recovery and continued strength, and a strong Europe meant that the US 
could continue to roll back its economic support of the region.  The US had no reason to 
support a rival program to the EEC, and every interest in making that bloc even stronger 
by promoting British entry. 
Dense analytical reports such as this were the private Harold Wilson’s bread and 
butter.  Wilson later wrote in his memoir that after reading exactly such a report, “the 
case for applying to join EEC had been strengthened in [his] mind.”28  Wilson’s memoir 
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focuses on portraying him as unchanging in his commitment to EEC since taking office 
in 1964.  Tellingly, this brief line is the closest he comes to admitting to changing his 
mind on the subject in the entire book.  To the private Wilson, everything came down to 
numbers.  This was the Wilson who gained a reputation as a brilliant statistician in 
World War II and who carried that reputation ever since.   
In stark contrast, the second Wilson- the public Wilson – was focused almost 
exclusively on the politics of the EEC.  In speeches, he was keen on, as he put it, taking 
“excursion[s] into history.”29  In these soliloquys, he began with the birth of the 
European nation-state and posited a forward progression of history: “not the negative 
concept of a retreat from imperialism, but the forward move from Empire to 
Commonwealth.”30  By Commonwealth, he meant a broad conception of international 
unity and cooperation.  As such, he framed EEC membership as an extension of the 
international fraternity that Britons felt with the Commonwealth they already had.  
European integration was the next inevitable phase of history.  Britain could embrace it 
or be left behind – and if it decided to embrace the EEC, it had to do so soon.  The EEC 
was a moving target that had been evolving since its inception.  The longer Britain 
waited to join, the longer its policies continued to evolve without British influence. 
Wilson placed particular emphasis on arguing that Britain’s technological 
prowess, if married with Europe’s vast markets, could allow the UK to return to its lost 
place as the world’s technological capitol.  In 1966, at the Prime Minister’s annual 
speech at Guildhall – the City of London’s town hall – Wilson advocated for: 
                                                          




…a drive to create a new technological community to pool within Europe the enormous 
technological inventiveness of Britain and other European countries, to enable Europe, 
on a competitive basis, to become more self-reliant…  I can think of nothing that would 
make a greater reality of the whole European concept.  And in this field of technological 
cooperation no one has more to contribute than Britain…31 
In making such arguments, Wilson attempted to reframe the issue from Britain needing 
Europe in order to remain relevant to Europe needing Britain in order to best realize its 
long-term objectives.  This tactic served twin purposes.  First, it was a marketing ploy 
aimed at Europe.  By asserting Britain’s usefulness to the EEC, Wilson attempted to 
create a better position for negotiating the UK’s terms of entry.32  Second, and more 
important to this thesis, it also served as an appeal to British national identity.  Britons 
took immense pride in their nation’s history as the cradle of the industrial revolution.  
At its peak, technological wizardry defined the Empire to Britons and to the world.  This 
sense of awe was perfectly captured by Jules Verne’s Around the World in Eighty Days, 
a novel dedicated in large part to breathlessly describing the expanse of the British 
Empire and the technology that enabled its success.  Verne, as a Frenchman, showed 
this from an outsider’s perspective though his protagonist Phileas Fogg was British.  
Britain’s technological mastery, however, was not to last.  The United States, spurred on 
by its massive industrial expansion during World War II, replaced Great Britain as the 
world’s technological mecca in the post-war era.  That usurpation robbed Britain of a 
key feature of its national identity.  Wilson, by suggesting that EEC membership could 
position Britain to become the technological center of Europe, offered Britons a chance 
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to reclaim a prized title that had been lost.  Wilson’s argument, however, looked 
forward, not backward. 
By pairing his technological argument with his “excursions into history,” Wilson 
formulated a new British national identity rooted in carving out a unique and important 
role for Britain as a component of Europe, not as an independent state.  Britain could 
once again become a technological powerhouse, but only by joining with Europe in “a 
new unity.”33  According to Wilson’s narrative, Britain no longer had a place in the world 
alone, but as a part of Europe it could once again taste international glory.  Moreover, if 
Britain resisted this new identity, it would be fighting the “forward move” of history.34  
Britain, he argued, must swim with the tide. 
This new public Wilson is difficult to reconcile with the technocrat who managed 
Britain’s “Other War” during World War II.  Historians may never be certain of the exact 
reason for the sharp divide between the private Wilson and the public Wilson.  His 
memoirs are much too guarded.  The public Wilson’s argument was a political tactic, as 
are any arguments made by a politician.  The question of how he became convinced that 
his approach was the best possible tactic merits further investigation. 35  Nevertheless, 
his argument was prescient regardless of how it was formulated. 
Britons by and large did not take to Wilson’s narrative in 1967, but by the 1975 
referendum it was the dominant mode of thinking.  Wilson’s argument foreshadowed 
the shift in British national identity that asserted itself in the 1975 referendum.  In order 
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to understand the full magnitude of that shift, however, one must first examine the 





Keep Calm and Carry On:  The 1967 EEC Debate in Public Discourse 
This is something which we know, in our bones, we cannot do…  For Britain’s story and her 
interests lie far beyond the continent of Europe. 
-Anthony Eden, 1952 
__________________________________ 
Harold Wilson’s narrative of British history failed to translate into public 
approval for EEC membership in 1967.  While Britain’s major national newspapers were 
full of economic jargon and interchangeable letters of support for EEC from Members of 
Parliament, the country’s regional newspapers were flooded with a storm of letters 
raging against membership.  There were letters of support as well, but in the six regional 
papers examined in this study the negative letters dramatically outnumbered the 
positive.  That is not to claim that all of British public opinion was opposed to EEC by 
that same majority; angry people are more motivated to act than their happy 
counterparts, resulting in an unavoidable bias toward angrier respondents in formats 
such as Letters to the Editor.  In addition, one can never rule out editorial bias in the 
selection of which letters were published.  Nevertheless, the sheer scale of the letters 
sent, the rhetorical ferocity of so many of those letters, and the remarkable consistency 
in themes between them regardless of geographic distribution indicates that passionate, 
motivated opposition to EEC membership was widespread. 
The letters, pro and con, all centered around three key themes in the EEC debate: 
British pride, separation from continental Europe, and British cultural heritage.  While 
these themes are all uniquely recognizable, and for ease of analysis will be examined 




intersected in important ways.  Taken together, they create a thorough depiction of 
British self-perception and identity as it stood in 1967.  That the notion of joining the 
EEC challenged all three of these pillars of identity goes a long way toward explaining 
why it was such a fundamental affront to the way that so many Britons viewed their 
nation and themselves. 
British history was infused in all three of these themes, and the memory of 
Britain’s experience during World War II was particularly pervasive.  In 1967, the 
British myth of World War II as the nation’s finest hour – the moment that Britain 
saved the world from the forces of tyranny by standing up alone and refusing to give in 
where the larger nations of Europe had all crumbled – was as powerful as ever.  Britain 
was the savior of Europe, the argument went.  The thought of now asking help from 
those weak nations that had rolled over to Hitler was a disgrace, let alone the thought of 
going to Hitler’s nation itself.  As a former member of the 8th Army disdainfully put the 
issue, “Whatever happened to this country that we go sniveling to the people who, 25 
years ago, were beholden to us for saving their country?”1  This question was implicit in 
many of the letters from 1967.  Thus, history – and particularly the narrative of British 
history established by Winston Churchill – determined the framework through which 
Britons understood the EEC.  In 1967, that framework showed no signs of loosening.  
History was a barrier that could not yet be overcome.  Instead, Britons decided to keep 
calm and carry on just as they did in World War II, whatever the outcome. 
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The first and most fundamental theme exposed by Wilson’s EEC application was 
what one correspondent to The Birmingham Post referred to as “the symbol British,” 
but what could be more simply termed British national pride.  The letter in question was 
written by C. J. Gorhmann of Hall Green and was published by the Post on May 9, 1967 
under the header “Britain and the ‘Six’ – a question of loyalties.”  Gorhmann used 
sweeping language, referring to the EEC issue as “the sword of Damocles,” forever 
hanging over the heads of the British people.  He used the metaphor of the dog that had 
a bone, but saw a larger one reflected in the water in front of him.  The dog dropped his 
bone in the water to get the reflection, but ended up with no bone at all.  Gorhmann 
implied that such would be the case if Britain abandoned the Commonwealth in favor of 
Europe.  But despite Gorhmann’s vivid figurative language, his letter was most revealing 
when at its bluntest:  “We are tired of the humiliation that the once mighty British 
should go, cap in hand, to European heads with the appeal, ‘Please can we come in?’…  
Let the symbol British once again mean something in the world.”2  To Gorhmann, 
British national pride was at an all-time low, and joining with Europe would only 
damage it further by taking away Britain’s last semblance of independence. 
Gorhmann’s letter is one of the clearest illustrations of a connection that 
constantly recurred in the public opinion of 1967: the link between Britain’s level of 
international respect and the self-respect of the British people.  It is essential to realize 
just how personal this link was.  For many Britons in 1967, the reputation of their nation 
was not simply tied to some vague notion of collective patriotism; Britain was their daily 
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source of motivation and self-esteem.  “What man ever did his best when his personal 
pride had been taken from him?” asked A. M. Gidman of Manchester.  “The same is true 
of a nation.  We are being stripped of everything we had pride in.  How shall we put 
forth all the efforts we are told we should, and why?”3  To Mrs. Gidman and many like 
her, the symbol British – the idea that Britain was not just another country among many 
but the lion that steered the world – was a vital part of the fabric of their lives.  Gidman’s 
words evoked depression.  She questioned not just how she could overcome the 
challenges of the future, but what the effort would even be for if Britons no longer held 
pride in their nation.  She derived self-worth from her nation’s reputation. 
For many, the modern sources of British national pride were Britain’s role in 
World War II and the Commonwealth.  Churchill’s “Finest Hour” narrative created a 
distinct superiority complex in the British national psyche – by “saving” Europe, Britain 
had established itself as in a different league than the Continent.  This post-war 
superiority complex in turn magnified the importance of the Commonwealth to Britons 
everywhere.  “S,” an ex-Eighth Army and Intelligence Service member, illustrated this 
dynamic in the clearest terms possible in the pages of the Manchester Evening News.  
“In 1940, this country had a moment of truth,” S writes.  “Among the few friends we had 
were the Canadians, the Australians, and New Zealanders.  They were with us to the 
death…  We should stick to our friends, our real friends, the tried and true…  And those 
real friends are not in Europe.  They never have been and they never will be.”4  To 
Britain, the Commonwealth allies stayed in the fight to the bitter end, where the 
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European nations that the Government now sought to join either rolled over or were the 
source of the cataclysm.   
Of course, the reason that the Commonwealth nations did not succumb to Nazi 
Germany was the very fact that they were not a part of Europe.  It had little to do with 
their natural fortitude or unwavering loyalty; Hitler had enough on his plate on his own 
continent.  Nevertheless, to the British the Commonwealth had succeeded where Europe 
had failed, and as such earned Britain’s loyalty now that the war was over.  The thought 
of abandoning the Commonwealth in favor of Europe was viewed by many as nothing 
less than spitting in the face of Britain’s heritage.  As S concluded, “anything that 
weaken[s] the ties between Britain and her kith and kin… is bad, dangerously bad, 
morally bad, infamously bad.” 
In the view of Britons, the Commonwealth nations took on a somewhat 
contradictory character.  They were the brave few that stood with Britain, but they were 
also spoken of as children in need of guidance.  “Before our eyes stretches the 
consortium of nations which we created and which, for seven years has been sadly 
neglected – crying out for leadership in this bewildering world!” wrote P.H.5  This 
paternalistic tone is pervasive in the way that Britons spoke of the Commonwealth in the 
1967 EEC debate.  In a different letter, the same P.H. brought the subtext front and 
center: “May 11, 1967: one of the great dates in history.  The day when Britain gave up 
her role as ‘Mother’ of a group of nations embracing a quarter of the world…”6  Britain’s 
relationship to the Commonwealth was a powerful cocktail, then – Britain 
simultaneously viewed itself as both mother and comrade-in-arms, to say nothing of the 
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Commonwealth’s immense symbolic value as the last living vestige of the once-mighty 
British Empire. 
The Commonwealth was used as the basis for the primary counterproposal to 
EEC entry: an expanded free trade zone consisting of the Commonwealth, the EFTA 
nations, and in some proposals the United States.  As discussed in Chapter 1, Wilson 
and his cabinet examined this proposal in great detail, but no matter the angle 
concluded that it was economically unsound.  To the public, however, the debate was 
driven more by emotion than analysis.   
Take, for example, a letter from Mrs. L. H. Midwinter.  After supporting the free 
trade zone consisting of the Commonwealth and EFTA states, she wrote: “Surely we are 
more akin to them than to the French – who let us down in the war, and to the Germans 
whose wartime crimes against humanity will never be forgotten.”7  Or, for an angrier 
opinion, there was F.J.M. of Timperley.  To F.J.M., British politicians “frittered away the 
Empire…  Had our heritage been managed properly we could have had our own world-
wide common market.”  Right on cue, F.J.M. concluded by once again bringing it back 
to World War II with gusto:  “Dr. Goebbels’ main ambition during the last war was to 
see Britain ‘a forgotten little island lost in the mists of the North Sea.’  Our politicians 
are doing the job for him.”8 
Britons’ emotional ties to the Commonwealth, dramatically enhanced by the 
experience of World War II, were so overwhelming that in one remarkable letter they 
even served as an argument against analytical evaluation.  Defending the 
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Commonwealth-EFTA free trade zone against (accurate) claims that it was statistically 
unfeasible, this correspondent wrote: “Thank goodness that staticians [sic] were 
overruled in 1939.  Facts and figures (and computers) would have proved that it was 
impossible for us to win the war, and by now, those of us who were not exterminated 
would all be good little Nazis.” 9  This reference to statisticians can be read as a slight 
against Harold Wilson, who served as a statistician during the war.  The writer 
concludes by urging politicians to trust in “the spirit of the British people” to overcome 
any challenge.  The spirit of the British people, however, was in many ways built on the 
values of logic and reason.  Britain’s rise to glory stemmed from its status as the heart of 
the industrial revolution.  Its cultural icons were men such as Charles Darwin and Isaac 
Newton, its foremost literary hero Sherlock Holmes – all symbols of the power of 
science and logic.  But such was the power of the Commonwealth when infused with the 
battle scars of World War II – it was enough to convince many Britons that blood was 
thicker than reason. 
The extent to which British national pride colored the ins and outs of everyday 
life for many is seen in a letter from S. D. of South Reddish.  S. D. claimed to have never 
purchased any textile goods of foreign manufacture in his/her life in an effort to remain 
true to the Queen.  The writer worries, however, that after joining the ECC such a 
British-only policy will no longer be possible, what with the Continent “poised ready to 
flood this country with their own goods, but not for our benefit!”10  While S. D.’s 
particular expression of pride may have been eccentric, it speaks to the concrete power 
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of British national pride in the ways that Britons lived their lives.  And just as poor S. D. 
feared, that pride was fading. 
 Britain’s fall from eminence was a process that began well before Harold Wilson 
decided to apply to the EEC.  Nevertheless, to many Britons the possibility of joining the 
EEC was the source of Britain’s fall, not a response to it.  A reader of the Birmingham 
Post wrote that because of the decision to join Europe, “the damage is done… in the eyes 
of the world Britain is now finished as a great nation.”11  A correspondent identified only 
as “Patriot” concurred in one of the grimmest letters of the debate: 
Where is our national pride? …It is high time that the peoples of these isles aroused 
themselves from their torpor and realised that what Philip of Spain, Napoleon of France, 
the Kaiser and Hitler of Germany could not accomplish by force is about to be realised by 
European political dominance over Britain…  Wake up, Britain, to the tremendous 
implications involved, raise your voices in protest.12 
T. S. Pursell drove the point home even further in the pages of Express & Star on May 3.  
If Britain joins the ECC, Pursell wrote, “…the lion’s roar would become a miserable 
squeak.  It would be a signal to sound the ‘last post’ and haul down the Union Jack.  The 
outside world would regard Britain as a third rate power and a spent force.”13  Taken 
together, these letters illuminate a widespread, consistent logic.  Britons derived a sense 
of pride and purpose from their nation’s global status, which was under attack by the 
looming threat of joining with Europe; therefore, the EEC directly threatened to rob 
Britons of their pride and their purpose.  It was taken as a personal affront, and Britons 
reacted accordingly. 
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 Opinions in favor of joining with Europe were fuelled by the same basic impulse.  
The key difference in rhetoric, however, was the pro-Europe camp’s view of the EEC as a 
bandage to an already-bleeding wound rather than a fresh injury.  “On balance, and with 
nostalgia, I am in favour of entry, as I should like to think that Great Britain will still be 
a force to be reckoned with when my granddaughter reaches maturity,” opined Sutton 
Coldfield’s E. T. Lea.14  Lea’s recognition of the “nostalgia” in her argument is a powerful 
insight into the debate at large, not simply her contribution.  Almost everyone in the 
debate yearned for Britain to return to its days of glory, and almost everyone was 
personally scarred by the decline of British national pride.  The difference lay in 
approach: should Britain return to the glory days by mimicking the behavior of the past, 
or should it attempt to create a new glory day by forging a different future?  For many, 
the answer to that question was determined by the answer to another: were Britons 
European?   
Are We European? 
 The second thread that must be traced to understand the 1967 EEC debate is the 
question of whether Britons considered themselves part of Europe or a separate entity.  
The most revealing window into this question was an exchange of letters sent to The 
Liverpool Daily Post in response to the Liverpool City Council’s decision to fly the 
European Flag on May 5 as a symbol of approval for Wilson’s EEC decision.  An article 
published in the Daily Post described the outrage that many Liverpudlians expressed 
over this decision.  The first writer to respond to the article was John Rimmer, in favor 
of the City Council’s decision.  “The hysterical opposition… would lead one to think that 
                                                          





the Council had advocated federation with Luxembourg…  We are a European nation by 
history and geography…  We should be proud of our place in Europe; not ashamed of it 
in a display of insular chauvinism.”15   
As Mr. Rimmer may have expected, the “hysterical opposition” that he 
denounced was not content to sit quietly.  “How can we be European,” J. R. Gradwell 
asked, “when our language differs from any spoken on the Continent… and our legal and 
Parliamentary systems are also very different?”  On the subject of World War II, 
Gradwell added that “we were only in a position to oppose Hitler because we were self-
governing, and not a part of an amorphous ‘Europe.’”16  Gradwell identified himself in 
the letter as the Secretary of the Merseyside Committee Anti-Common Market League.  
A. Morris, replying three days later, took note of Gradwell’s affiliation.  “Mr. Gradwell’s 
society should be re-named ‘fuddy duddies,’” Morris wrote.17  That may be so, but 
Gradwell’s Anti-Common Market League was no Liverpool anomaly.  It was a national 
organization with branches across Britain, primarily composed of Tories, that had 
enough members and funding to organize door-to-door canvassing and pamphlets that 
were mailed to houses nationwide on election years throughout the 1960s and 1970s.  
Rimmer, the writer of the first letter, also responded to Gradwell’s rebuttal, though his 
new letter was contained to a dry explication of the English language’s European roots.18 
This exchange shows that opinion on Britain’s identity as a European state – or 
lack thereof – was split and passionately defended on both sides of the divide.  That it 
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was kicked off by public uproar over the City Council’s flying of the European flag 
indicates either that the balance was tilted more toward the anti-Europe camp, or that 
that camp was much louder than their opposite numbers.  But while this exchange was 
the only time that the question of Britain’s place in Europe was directly confronted, the 
language used by Britons in the debate – even those who supported joining the EEC – 
points toward a consensus feeling that Britain and Europe were indeed naturally 
separate entities.  Take, for instance, L. Hyman’s letter to the Manchester Evening News 
of May 3.  “Surely we… have a right to some say in the matter as to whether we are 
willing to give up our traditional independent way of life and to become partners with 
people with whom we have very little in common.”19  This letter shares a common thread 
with Pursell’s - joining with the EEC is perceived as the first step in the process of 
European domination over Britain.  This very idea indicates that in the minds of these 
writers, Britain is indeed separate from Europe; otherwise the phrase “European 
domination over Britain” would be meaningless.  There is another issue that links these 
letters together with many others as well.  The EEC was not merely a threat to Britain’s 
non-European identity, but also threatened to put an end to its noble heritage of 
sovereignty and democracy. 
British Heritage 
 British letter-writers in 1967 felt that by joining the EEC, Britain would be 
abandoning its unique cultural heritage in exchange for amalgamation with a faceless 
European bloc.  In formulating their argument, they focused on two facets of British 
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heritage: Britain’s history as a nation rooted in liberty and traditional British domestic 
values.   
The EEC presented a two-front attack on Britons’ conception of their 
constitutional heritage.  It was believed that the EEC would strip Parliament and the 
Queen of their sovereignty and, in the memorable phrase of one self-proclaimed 
“ordinary housewife,” transform England into “a nonentity.”20  But equally damaging to 
Britain’s liberty in the eyes of many was Parliament’s decision to force Britain into the 
EEC in the first place.  There were numerous calls for a public referendum and 
accusations of Parliamentary dictatorship.  L. M. Hopkins, a reader of the Evening Post, 
summed up the mood so well on May 2 that the subsequent week, the paper published 
three opinions in praise of his letter.  “The moment the Treaty was signed,” Hopkins 
wrote, “the constitutional status of H. M. the Queen would be grievously impaired.  
Seven hundred years of developing parliamentary government would be jeapardised…”  
Hopkins went on to accuse the Government of being manipulated by “powerful vested 
interests” and declared that “it would be nothing short of blatant dictatorship to apply 
for entry without first arranging a national referendum.” 21   
Hopkins’ cry was repeated in letters to newspapers across the country, often 
accompanied by the refrain that the Government had “no mandate” for its actions.22  
“Why should a handful of men in Parliament take it upon themselves to force a nation of 
51M people into a position… which the vast majority of the people do not want?” asked 
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L. Hyman.23  In a letter from T. Jones, one can sense a feeling of betrayal and 
exasperation:  “I do not want it.  Nor do millions of others.  But what can we do?  Who 
can we vote for?”24  The rhetoric reached its venomous pinnacle in the hands of Mrs. 
Stella Gentry of Bristol.  “Like naughty children, those of us who reject our proposed 
entry into the Common Market… are reprimanded for not knowing what is best for us.  
‘Eat up your cabbage, it’s good for you!’  The same applies.”25  There are many, more 
letters that cover the same ground, ranging from the down-to-earth language of Mrs. 
Gentry to simple expressions of frustration as blunt as these words by an unnamed 
writer from Salford: “Far too much power lies in the hands of too few… It’s time the 
whole system was changed.”26  In all of these letters, the message is clear: Parliament 
was acting against the will of the people and was throwing away Britain’s national 
sovereignty; the people must be allowed to decide their own fate. 
The prominence of calls for a national referendum and the derision of Parliament 
for acting without one was a telling phenomenon.  In 1967, there had never been a 
national referendum in the United Kingdom.  What these many letter-writers were 
asking for was unprecedented.  That a referendum on the EEC would be viewed as a 
right of the British people – that Parliament would be accused of dictatorship in a 
country where Parliament, not the people, was sovereign –reflected Britons’ deeply held 
myth of their country as a progenitor and bastion of liberty.  A referendum would itself 
be an infringement of Parliamentary sovereignty.  Thus, by demanding a referendum, 
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Britons indicated that independence from Europe was a more important component of 
their national identity than preserving Parliamentary sovereignty.  Their heritage as an 
abstract home for liberty was more important than the institutions through which that 
liberty had traditionally been defended.  In reaching these conclusions, Britons 
subscribed to a particular narrative of their history – one in which Britain’s primary 
defining feature was its separation from Europe.  That narrative was rarely challenged in 
1967; the weight of history was too great. 
 British heritage was also closely connected to the traditional domestic values 
represented by the “ordinary housewife.”  Traditional gender roles were being 
challenged across the Western world in the second half of the 1960s, and for Britons 
that change was linked to the fall of British national pride.  The Empire had been the 
defining fact of British life for generations – a source of stability.  When that stability fell 
away, it seemed as though nothing was sacred and nothing was safe.  The reaction – as it 
always is when the status quo is challenged – was to clamp down, hence the recurring 
focus on the simple British housewife that was so often used as a counterpoint to the 
complicated techno-jargon and fast-paced cosmopolitan drive of the pro-EEC forces.  If 
Britons could hold on to their traditional domestic way of life, perhaps they could hold 
on to the spirit of the Empire as well.   
We have already met one such “ordinary housewife,” but she was far from the 
only person to identify herself as such.  In fact, the phrase “ordinary housewife” served 
as a powerful recurring symbol for British domestic traditions in the 1967 debate.  It was 




housewives to signal their detachment from the lofty, philosophical side of the debate 
and their interest in more material concerns.   
A letter from M. V. Passmore of Penmaenmawr, the same housewife mentioned 
earlier, acted as an early template for similar letters to come.  On May 1, she wrote to the 
Liverpool Daily Post:  “Will someone please tell an ordinary housewife just what are the 
benefits we may expect if we join the Common Market?  …It is said that butter would 
cost 8s a pound, and the Sunday joint two or three times its present price.  Exactly what 
are the benefits?”27  D. G. Hulin made the same argument in Bristol: “If every housewife 
were made aware of the increased cost of food alone I am sure the majority would vote 
against entry.”28  And Mrs. Beedell, also of Bristol, agreed: “Does the housewife realise 
what [Common Market entry] will mean?  It is going to make some weekly pay packets 
look pretty sick.”29  Mrs. Williams of Clevedon brought it home: “We shall just have to 
lower our standard of living which, with two children to bring up, is not what we 
expected to have to do.”30 
The main concern in all of these letters is the increase in the cost of living that 
was predicted upon entry into the EEC – a concern shared in dozens of other letters – 
but the specific focus on the housewife in these letters and others is notable.  The 
housewife was not just a symbol of the simple, traditional way of British living; she 
evoked the glory days of the Empire.  The world was rapidly changing in the 1960s – the  
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EEC threatening to bring yet more change –  but in these letters one could never tell that 
the domestic life of Britons which formed an essential part of their national identity had 
budged an inch in the last century. 
Weaving the Threads Together:  British National Identity in the 1967 Debate 
This chapter has traced three threads of argument in the 1967 EEC debate: the 
dwindling of British national pride, the question of whether Britain was a European 
state or an entity of its own, and the uniqueness of Britain’s cultural heritage.  All three 
of these threads were built on the same foundation: a particular narrative of British 
history that posited that Britons were preordained to lead the world, and that if they 
were not fulfilling that role, they were not fulfilling their destiny.  When one steps back, 
these threads are revealed to form a tightly-knit fabric that composes a comprehensive 
portrait of British identity in 1967. 
 The legacy of World War II not only reinforced ties to the Commonwealth in the 
minds of Britons – it gave them something new to be proud of just as they lost the 
Empire, their old source of national pride.  The narrative of World War II as Britain’s 
“finest hour” convinced Britons that their golden age was recent enough to be within 
reach.  Rather than viewing the decline of the British Empire as the gradual process that 
it was, the heroic narrative of World War II made it seem as though Britain went from 
riches to rags in a mere twenty years.  It kept Britons in denial for decades; the move 
toward the European Community was consequently felt as a violent upheaval and 
disillusionment rather than the culmination of a gradual shift.  The rhetoric of the age 




 Similarly, Britain’s heritage of liberty was an essential component of its identity.  
Much like the Commonwealth was viewed as the last vestige of the British Empire, the 
notion of parliamentary republicanism and the sovereignty of the queen served as the 
final wall in the fortress of British greatness.  The Empire may have been gone, but as 
long as Britain’s unique form of government remained intact, Britain would forever be a 
special place on earth.  At least Britons still had the Queen.  The EEC threatened to 
fundamentally challenge the British form of government, and with it strip away the last 
layer of meaning of traditional British identity. 
 The British identity that had been in place for generations was challenged on 
every front by the 1967 bid for entry into the EEC.  It was an identity rooted in the 
symbolic and material power of the British Empire.  People across Britain derived 
personal value from the Empire; they were raised with the narrative that the Empire 
made them unique and gave their lives meaning.  A long history of parliamentary 
governance and a commitment to individual liberty was a strong component of the 
Empire, as was an idealized vision of simple domestic living.  World War II renewed the 
narrative of British uniqueness for a new generation, convincing Britons that their 
nation was different from the rest of Europe, putting up an invisible wall in the English 
Channel between those who fell to Hitler and those who stood fast.  It also added 
potency to Britons’ feeling of connection to the Commonwealth states, who stood fast 
with them.  The possibility of joining the European Community posed a direct threat to 
every one of these central tenets of British identity.  Britons were left with a choice: fight 
a futile battle to return to the past and effectively become Goebbels’ threatened “little 




succumb to one narrative of their history, or they could rewrite that narrative and 





“The Choice is Yours”:  The 1975 UK National Referendum 
He who rejects change is the architect of decay.  The only human institution which rejects 
progress is the cemetery. 
-Harold Wilson, January 23, 1967 
_________________________ 
 On July 3, 1975, Harold Wilson delivered a short speech at Camden Town Hall in 
North London on the subject of why the UK should remain in the European Community.  
A rambunctious atmosphere filled the packed hall.  Members of the crowd began 
shouting over Wilson shortly after his speech began.  “Every minute you are interrupting 
there is another one thousand votes for yes,” Wilson scolded, trusting that the British 
public desired a polite debate rather than a shouting match.  The hecklers only grew 
louder.  Wilson, becoming frustrated, asked if there were any communists in the 
audience and accused the hecklers of “total intolerance.”  Finally, after twenty minutes 
of failing to be heard over the angry roar of the crowd, Wilson – still on stage – took a 
sip of water, lit up his pipe, and smoked it to completion in silence while the crowd kept 
screaming.  Eventually the din died down, and Wilson resumed his speech.1  In that 
moment, Harold Wilson came face to face with the furious public resistance to Britain’s 
membership in the EEC.  He responded with a touch of ideological grandstanding, then 
by stepping back and relaxing while the hecklers shouted themselves hoarse – by 
knowing when his voice had outgrown its use and letting the voice of the public take 
over, whether they supported him or not.  On a larger scale, this same strategy was at 
the heart of the 1975 UK referendum. 
                                                          




 The 1975 referendum was a shrewd political move by Wilson in his ongoing 
struggles with both the Conservative opposition and the anti-Europe wing of his own 
party, but it was also the watershed moment in which Britons were finally forced to 
decide what sort of nation Britain would become.  Since World War II, most Britons 
were content with their nation’s independent, “Finest Hour”-tinged identity.  The 
economy was in disarray, Britain’s international influence was on the decline, but that 
was all the more reason to hunker down and trust the British stiff upper lip to see the 
UK through to its next finest hour.  For decades, the British government had been 
moving toward closer ties with Europe in fits and starts.  However, every step that it 
took was cut short, either by a firm “Non” from General De Gaulle or by the lingering 
power of the “Finest Hour” narrative.  By 1975, De Gaulle had stepped away from power 
as the result of losing a public referendum and Britain was a member of the ECC, but a 
strong contingency of the British population – still clinging to Britain’s old identity – 
was declaring EEC membership a betrayal of the nation and calling for withdrawal.   
Wilson backed the referendum as a political ploy designed to restore unity to 
Labour at a moment when it threatened to fracture into pro and anti-EEC camps, but 
once he embraced the referendum he began to promote it is a final test of British intent.  
Either the public would vote against EEC membership and maintain its World War II 
identity or it would approve the EEC and commit itself to Europe.  Wilson argued that 
either choice would finally put an end to Britain’s infighting and indecision, and 
consequently the nation’s decades-long identity crisis.  Thus, though the referendum 
had petty political origins, it quickly gained enormous symbolic value as the vehicle 




their nation would take.  The Wilson Government consciously promoted this 
interpretation, particularly in the informational pamphlets that it distributed to every 
home in Britain.  In doing so, it framed the referendum as a watershed moment in 
British history – a moment in which the people could assert their ownership of British 
national identity.  Wilson did not set out to do this, but once the train started rolling it 
could not be stopped.  Wilson climbed aboard and claimed it as his own. 
Origins of the Referendum 
 The referendum was conceived as a response to the perception that the British 
government forced the UK into the ECC against the will of the people.  In 1970, Harold 
Wilson lost the national election to Edward Heath of the Conservative Party.  Heath, 
building on the groundwork laid by Wilson in his negotiations with the European heads 
of state in 1967, promptly filed the UK’s third application for entry into the EEC.  In the 
years since the 1967 application, Charles De Gaulle stepped away from power and was 
replaced by the more Anglo-friendly Georges Pompidou as President of France.  
Without De Gaulle there to say “Non,” Britain finally joined the European Economic 
Community in 1972.  The public, however, remained deeply divided.  A Gallup poll from 
January 1975 – just after the referendum was officially announced – reported that fifty-
five percent of respondents were in favor of withdrawing from the EEC.  Forty-five 
percent wished to remain inside.2 
 This division extended to Wilson’s Labour Party, which despite falling in with 
Wilson’s pro-Europe stance in 1967 became fiercely opposed to British membership in 
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the EEC while out of power from 1970 to 1974.  In his memoirs, Wilson characterized 
this time as “a miserably unhappy period.”3  He was still Leader of the Labour Party, but 
the Party was rebelling.  Tony Benn, an influential Member of Parliament and champion 
of the far-left who served as Chairman of the Labour Party for a year between 1971 and 
1972, was the de facto leader of the “anti-marketeers” – the wing of the party opposed to 
EEC membership.  Benn led the charge in declaring that Heath sold Britain down the 
river to Europe by accepting terms less favorable to the UK than the ones that Wilson 
had been negotiating in 1967. 
In particular, Benn attacked the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), a mandatory 
system for EEC members that established standard minimum prices for agriculture, 
imposed tariffs on agricultural imports from outside the EEC, and provided major 
subsidies to farms in EEC member states.  In 1970, seventy percent of the EEC’s budget 
was spent on the CAP.4  Benn and the anti-marketeers argued that the fixed prices 
imposed by the CAP would increase food prices in the UK and that Britain would not 
benefit from the associated subsidies due to its relatively small agriculture industry 
compared to those of the other EEC member states.  The result would be a rise in the 
British standard of living with little accompanying benefit. 
At this time, Labour endorsed the idea of a public referendum as a means of 
deferring the EEC decision to the public.  The idea for the referendum originally came 
from the “Eurosceptic” wing of the Conservative Party, which proposed the referendum 
to Parliament in 1969.  The proposal failed, with only 55 Members of Parliament voting 
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in its favor.5  After the Tories failed to make the referendum a reality, in 1972 the anti-
marketeers in Labour embraced the idea as a political weapon.  Their goal was first and 
foremost to damage Edward Heath’s Conservative government, which was criticized for 
accepting terms of entry that were disadvantageous to Britain.6  The anti-marketeers 
viewed the referendum as little more than a way to embarrass their opposition.  Wilson, 
standing strong in his conviction that Britain’s future was inside the EEC (though its 
entry terms should be renegotiated), at first resisted the calls for referendum.  In 1973, 
however, he saw an opportunity.  
In a bid to maintain control of his party, Wilson worked with Judith Hart – a 
well-respected MP – in crafting a statement on Labour’s position on the EEC to be 
included in the Party’s 1973 electoral platform.  The statement was designed to appease 
the anti-marketeers by stating that Labour “opposes British membership of the 
European Communities on the terms negotiated by the Conservative Government,” but 
supports continued British membership in the EEC under renegotiated conditions.7  The 
statement laid out specific goals for renegotiation, including “major changes in the 
Common Agricultural Policy” as well as “new and fairer methods of financing the 
Community budget.”  Most importantly, the proposal ended by declaring that “if 
renegotiations are successful… in view of the unique importance of the decision, the 
people should have the right to decide the issue.”8  Wilson submitted the program to the 
Labour Party’s autumn 1973 conference.  Though it required Wilson to threaten 
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resignation and a subsequent Party leadership struggle on the eve of an election, the 
National Executive Committee – Labour’s leadership body – eventually approved the 
formula by a vote of 14 to 11.9  It was incorporated into Labour’s Programme 1973 – the 
Party’s official public platform document. 
Wilson embraced the referendum as a matter of managing his party, but it 
quickly became much more.  Bernard Donoughue, a senior policy advisor for Wilson at 
the time, later wrote that Wilson’s objectives were “to prevent Labour from inescapably 
committing itself to withdrawal from the EEC, and from breaking up the Party over the 
issue.”10  By embracing the referendum and committing himself to promoting the “Yes” 
vote, Wilson hoped to take what the anti-marketeers had planned as a weapon against 
the Tories and turn it into a weapon against the anti-marketeers, all while seemingly 
giving them what they wanted.  However, though it started as a clever political tactic, 
once embraced it became much more significant. 
From the beginning, Wilson framed the referendum as a symbolic deference to 
the British public.  As there was no popular sovereignty in the British political system, 
the referendum could never be legally required or technically binding.  However, the 
issue of Britain joining with Europe was billed as a matter of such importance to Britain 
that even Parliament could not adequately speak for the people.  As Wilson presented 
the referendum, the question of joining with Europe was bigger than the government, 
bigger than British law, and bigger than tradition.  It was a matter of principle that only 
the people themselves could answer, despite there being no precedent and no legal 
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justification for a referendum.  Unsurprisingly, the questionable constitutionality of the 
referendum did not go unnoticed by the Conservative opposition. 
The Fight for the Referendum 
 When Wilson returned to the office of the Prime Minister in 1970, one of his first 
orders of business was to follow through on the promises of Labour’s Programme 1973 
by meeting with the other European leaders and renegotiating Britain’s EEC 
membership terms.  The renegotiations, though they fell short of Wilson’s ambitious 
goals, were fruitful enough for Wilson to declare them a success.  Wilson did not 
disclose the new terms, however, until March 1975 – two months after he declared 
success and announced his intention to plan the referendum. 
When he finally revealed the terms, in a White Paper titled Membership of the 
European Community: Report on Renegotiation, it was in vague language.  The White 
Paper reported that “CAP price levels have been held down in real terms; progress has 
been made towards relating them more closely to the needs of efficient producers, and 
towards securing a better balance between supply and demand.”11  The paper did not 
disclose the details of this “progress” beyond asserting that the European Commission 
was reappraising the CAP and had recently submitted a report that “holds out prospects 
both of further progress on the lines already advocated by the Government and of other 
improvements which can be welcomed.”12  The White Paper was written as vaguely as 
possible for a reason: no specific agreements were made between Wilson and the other 
European leaders as to modifying the CAP – only an agreement to consider revision at 
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the CAP’s next scheduled periodic reappraisal.13  Wilson was likely wary of emphasizing 
the achievements of his renegotiations, only to have it come out that they contained few 
concrete changes.  Nevertheless, the promise of future European flexibility was enough 
for Wilson to move forward with the referendum. 
In the early stages of planning the referendum, debate in Parliament focused 
largely on the referendum’s implications for Parliamentary sovereignty.  On January 23, 
1975, Wilson delivered a speech in Parliament in which he officially announced the 
Government’s decision to hold a referendum.  At that point, the renegotiations were not 
yet complete and Wilson refused to officially support continued EEC membership.  He 
merely discussed the logistics of the referendum.  Early in his speech, he was 
interrupted by Edward Heath – the man that Wilson had recently unseated as Prime 
Minister.  Heath called the referendum a “major constitutional innovation” and asked 
Wilson to “confirm that the referendum, if it takes place, will be advisory and 
consultative and cannot be binding on Members of the House of the Commons.”14  
Wilson responded that he “cannot imagine that if the country votes clearly one way or 
the other… honorable Members would feel able to go against that decision and vote 
against.”15  Heath pushed back: “Whatever he [Wilson] may judge the attitude of right 
honorable [Heath] and honorable Members to be, will he [Wilson] confirm that a 
referendum cannot be constitutionally binding on any Member of this House, and that it 
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remains for Parliament to decide, if it so wishes, after the referendum?”16  Wilson had 
the final word on the subject: 
The right honorable Gentleman is, of course, right in the constitutional sense that no one 
can tell a Member of this House how to vote…  In that sense, the referendum could not 
be binding.  But I perhaps pay more attention to the views of the people in the country 
than the right honorable Gentleman… and I express the view that I could not imagine 
many honorable Members deciding to pit their own judgment in this matter against what 
has been the decision of the people of the country.  That is just my view.17 
On the surface, this retort reads as Wilson positioning himself as a populist leader well-
attuned to the will people; however, it also shows him playing a much longer game.  In 
speeches such as this, Wilson argued that in the matter of outlining a new national 
identity for Britain, the direct will of the British people was superior to British 
constitutional theory, or even to the British government.  Wilson agreed with Heath’s 
claim that the referendum was a constitutional “innovation” with no legal value; his 
response was to raise the stakes.  British identity was the domain of the people, not of 
the Government.  Thus, though the referendum technically had no teeth, in Wilson’s 
reckoning it was the duty of Parliament to accept the people’s will.  Parliament may have 
been sovereign, but Britain lived in the people.  With the referendum eventually 
approved, they were finally given the opportunity to decide Britain’s future. 
The Referendum Campaign 
 During the brief three months of the official referendum campaign, British public 
opinion swung from being narrowly opposed to the EEC to resoundingly in favor of 
continued membership.  A Gallup poll in January 1975 reported that fifty-five percent of 
the British public wanted to withdraw from the EEC while forty-five percent supported 
                                                          





membership; at the end of March, Gallup reported that sixty-six percent now supported 
membership with thirty-four percent opposed.18  Many factors contributed to this 
dramatic reversal.  The pro-market side’s resource advantage was gbone such factor. 
 Though the Government gave the “Yes” and “No” campaigns equal starting 
resources, the “Yes” campaign – which supported remaining in the EEC – was able to 
create a substantially larger operation.  The “Yes” and “No” campaigns centered around 
two organizations: Britain in Europe (BIE), as indicated by its name, supported 
continued EEC membership; the National Referendum Campaign (NRC) was its 
opposite number.  Both of these organizations were given £125,000 by the Government 
to conduct their campaigns and publish informational materials.  BIE, however, was 
able to raise another £1.8 million, primarily from pro-Europe businesses excited by the 
thought of having unlimited access to the European market.  The NRC only raised an 
additional £8,610.19  The relative scale of the two organizations reflected this monetary 
discrepancy.  The BIE had 163 official paid employees; the NRC had six.20  Finally, both 
organizations published and distributed pamphlets advocating their respective 
positions.  These pamphlets, with the help of the Government, were distributed to every 
house in every town in Britain.  The Government, however, released its own pamphlet 
advocating EEC membership as well.21  Thus, the average Briton received two pamphlets 
in favor of voting “Yes” – one of them carrying the seal of the Government – and only 
one in favor of voting “No.”  Taken together, these facts indicate that at least part of the 
“Yes” campaign’s success can be credited to its ability to outspend and outwork the 
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competition.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine a campaign propaganda advantage 
alone accounting for a twenty-one point swing in poll numbers in just three months.  
The “Yes” campaign’s economic advantage only worked because it was used to promote 
a message that resonated with the British people. 
 The best place to examine that message is in the Government pamphlet sent to 
every household in Britain.  That pamphlet, titled “Britain’s New Deal in Europe,” was 
the centerpiece of the “Yes” campaign.  It began with a letter from Wilson that 
emphasized the historic nature of the decision and closed with the statement, “Above all, 
I ask you to use your vote.  For it is your vote that will now decide.  The Government will 
accept your verdict.”22  The next section, headed “Your Right to Choose,” reminded 
readers: “The British people were promised the right to decide through the ballot box 
whether or not we should stay in the Common Market on new terms.  And that the 
Government would abide by the result…  The Government have recommended that 
Britain should stay in…  But you have the right to choose.”23  Before the pamphlet even 
presented an argument for why readers should vote to stay in the EEC, it devoted its 
first two sections to again emphasizing that this was a choice for the people, not the 
Government.  The pamphlet made no mention of the questionable constitutionality of 
the referendum.  Quite the opposite, it asserted multiple times that the people’s decision 
would be binding.  Wilson’s concession to Heath in Parliament that the referendum 
could not be constitutionally binding was deemed an unimportant technicality.  Again, 
the Wilson government sent the clear message that despite centuries of tradition, the 
British people – not Parliament – had the ultimate say in determining Britain’s future. 
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 Finally, on page five, the pamphlet began to present its argument for EEC 
membership, though its specifics were even vaguer than those in the White Paper that 
was earlier circulated in Parliament.  The pamphlet described the aims of the EEC as 
“To bring together the peoples of Europe” and “To help maintain peace and freedom.”24  
In a section titled “The New Deal,” the pamphlet quotes Wilson in saying that “I believe 
that our renegotiation objectives have been substantially though not completely 
achieved.” In describing those achievements, however, it simply says that “the Common 
Agricultural policy… now works more flexibly to the benefit of both housewives and 
farmers in Britain.”  The only specifics it cites are “special arrangements made for sugar 
and beef,” without saying what those arrangements are.25  To counteract the argument 
that staying in the EEC would be a betrayal of the Commonwealth, the pamphlet quoted 
statements of support for the EEC from the Prime Ministers of Australia and New 
Zealand.26  Responding to fears that the EEC would strip away British sovereignty, the 
pamphlet reminded readers that “in the modern world even the Super Powers… do not 
have complete freedom of action.  Medium-sized nations like Britain are more and more 
subject to economic and political forces we cannot control on our own.”27   
Finally, the pamphlet painted two scenarios of the future: one for “If We Say ‘No’” 
and one for “If We Say ‘Yes.’”  The “No” scenario was bleak.  “The Common Market will 
not go away if we say ‘No,’” the pamphlet argued, “We would just be outsiders looking 
in.”28  The “Yes” scenario, on the other hand, depicted a world in which life would still 
be tough in Britain, but it would have access to Europe’s markets, incoming European 
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Community money, and the ability to play a role in setting the policies of what the 
writers called the “world’s most powerful trading bloc.”29  This final point was at the 
heart of the pamphlet’s pro-EEC argument.   
As framed by the Wilson government, the referendum was a choice between 
Britain being something greater than itself or remaining a chain of islands in the 
Atlantic inching ever closer to isolation; between staying in the present or entering an 
unknown, exciting future.  Only Britons could make that choice.  The pamphlet urged 
them to vote “Yes,” but concluded with ten empowering words:  “The choice is up to 
YOU.  It is YOUR decision.”30 
This constant emphasis on the agency of the voters seems like a psychological 
ploy – a way to make Britons feel like they had control – but the fact is that Britons truly 
were in control.  Wilson’s commitment to the referendum was a gamble.  He placed his 
reputation – and likely his leadership – on the line in order to keep his party together 
and finally force Britain off the fence that it had been sitting on for decades.  By arguing 
that the referendum should be upheld as a matter of principle though it was not 
constitutionally binding, Wilson locked himself into submitting to the will of the people, 
whatever it may be.  What started for Wilson as a political ploy turned into a full-scale 
assault on Parliamentary sovereignty.  The referendum symbolized that Britain’s 
identity did not live in Parliament; it did not live in British tradition; it did not even live 
in the Queen.  It lived in the British people. 
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On June 5, 1975, the citizens of the UK were asked the question: “Do you think 
that the United Kingdom should stay in the European Community (The Common 
Market)?”  Approximately 40,086,000 Britons voted – a 64% turnout.  The results were 
conclusive: 67.2% voted “Yes” to remaining in the EEC; 32.8% voted no.31  All four parts 
of the United Kingdom – England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland – reported a 
majority for the “Yes” vote, with the widest margin in England (68.7% vs. 31.3%) and the 
narrowest in Northern Ireland (52.1% vs. 47.9%).  The people had spoken.  They had 
much more to say, however, than could ever be reflected in a simple “Yes” or “No.”  An 
examination of the public discourse leading up the referendum reveals just how painful 
a process it was for Britons to embrace Europe, but that they did it all the same. 
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England’s Dreaming:  The 1975 Referendum in Public Discourse 
God Save the Queen, we mean it man; and there is no future in England’s dreaming. 
 
-The Sex Pistols, God Save the Queen, 1977 
_______________________________ 
 During the three months of the 1975 EEC referendum campaign – and 
particularly during May, the final full month – British regional newspapers were 
inundated with a flood of letters from common Britons weighing in on the nation’s great 
debate.  These letters differed from the similar influx of letters during the 1967 debate.  
In 1967, most letter writers opposed EEC membership.  By 1975, most favored joining 
the EEC.  The memory of World War II loomed large in both batches of letters.  
However, in 1967 it was almost exclusively a rationale for keeping out of Europe.  
Britons didn’t need Europe in the 1940s, the argument went; why would they need it 
now?   
In 1975, that interpretation of World War still lingered for some, but others now 
contested it.  A new narrative was taking form that stressed that World War II was in 
fact about ending Europe’s history of nationalistic infighting once and for all.  The EEC, 
then, was a direct extension of the legacy of World War II – it was the binding together 
of Europe to ensure that the horrors of that war would never be repeated. 
 Britons contested another dominant narrative from 1967 in the 1975 public 
debate: the myth of British resilience.  In the 1967, the narrative of British toughness – 
that the British Bulldog could take on the world alone and that joining with Europe was 




marketeers subverted that narrative.  The anti-marketeers were the cowards in the new 
narrative, afraid that Britain would be unable to compete with the rest of Europe on an 
even footing.  True British toughness would be having the backbone to stay in the EEC; 
not just competing in the European market, but leading it into a new age of prosperity.  
 Finally, Britons once again debated the subject of British sovereignty, but this 
time the debate was complicated by the referendum itself.  The 1967 narrative that the 
EEC would allow Europe to dominate the UK and erode its national sovereignty was still 
intact in 1975 – though the fact that Britain had already been a member of the EEC for 
three years and the Queen was not yet in shackles made that argument less prominent.  
In 1975, however, the argument had a counterpoint.  The referendum that would allow 
Britons to leave the EEC – originally proposed by anti-marketeers – was, supporters 
argued, itself a violation of Parliamentary sovereignty.  Voting against the EEC in the 
referendum, and thereby overruling Parliament, would violate the basic tenets of the 
British constitution.  In the words of one letter-writer from Sutton Coldfield, if the 
objective was to preserve traditional British sovereignty, the situation was “Heads I win, 
tails you lose.”1  The true choice facing Britons, then, was not between sovereignty and 
European domination, but between two different avenues for undermining traditional 
Parliamentary sovereignty. 
 The 1975 public debate focused on the same general themes as the 1967 debate, 
but in 1975 they were subverted and contested to suit the needs of a population that, 
spurred on by their government’s failure to improve their quality of life or restore 
British international prestige, was finally ready to move toward a new Britain.  All of the 
                                                          




same anti-Europe arguments were mounted, but they were a statistical minority even 
among the small group of voters who were motivated enough to write in to their local 
newspapers.  Far more common were the letters in which writers embraced a new 
narrative British history in order to create a new future.  The past will always be a part of 
the present, but in 1975 Britons proved that the past can be malleable.  They were ready 
to wake up from England’s dreaming. 
By subtly shifting the narrative of their past, Britons transformed their history 
from a force that defended the status quo into a force for change.  If the 1967 debate 
proved that history can be a powerful causal force, the 1975 referendum proved that it 
can also be marshaled as a vital tool in framing large political departures.  History can 
be a controlling factor, but given enough motivation it can also be controlled.  This 
chapter will examine that process at work in the original words of those who voted in the 
1975 referendum. 
Going It Alone: Independence or Isolation? 
Four centuries ago, John Donne wrote “No man is an island, entire of itself; everyman 
is a piece of the Continent, a part of the main.”  Today we can say with equal certainty 
that no country is an island entire of itself no matter how much water surrounds it.2 
 
     -John Laure, 24, Oakdale Close, Downend, Bristol, 1975 
 
Free from the ties of bureaucracy we can as individuals still show the spirit of the 
British Bulldog.  Certainly there is nothing wrong in this country that the British people 
cannot rectify, given the opportunity.3 
 
     -Denis C. Barrett, Birmingham 90, 1975 
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In the months leading up to the 1975 referendum, Britons debated what it meant 
for their nation to be an island – literal and metaphorical.  The two letters excerpted 
above represented the two extremes of the argument.  Britain had long been on an 
independent course.  As an island without the national resources to maintain its large, 
modern population, it had always been dependent on the imports of other nations.  
However, those other nations were traditionally former British colonies – primarily the 
Commonwealth nations and the United States.  As such, they were part of Britain’s 
extended family and fit into Britain’s framework of perceived independence.4  Joining 
the EEC, however, meant recognizing – and codifying – British dependence on states 
other than its family members.  In 1967, this caused outrage.  By 1975, many had 
accepted it as a fact of life. 
 A letter from S. Mitchell in the Evening Post summarized the mood well.  
Advocating for a “Yes” vote in the referendum, Mitchell wrote:  “These islands have, of 
course, always been ‘specks on the globe,’ and for years I had marveled at the fact that 
we held sway over a quarter of the globe.  But things are different now.  We cannot ‘push 
outward’ and discover new lands and colonise a quarter of the world, which made these 
‘small specks of ours’ a force to be reckoned with…”5  Mitchell’s words hold a sense of 
resignation.  In his reckoning, the Empire was almost a fluke – something to be proud 
of, but something that was forever lost.  Britain was, in fact, dependent on other 
countries.  Britain’s EEC membership was simply a recognition of reality. 
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 Alison Tyler reflected that same resignation in her letter to the Birmingham Post.  
“Personally, I find it hard to see a future for Britain at all,” she lamented.  “But I do think 
that if we have a future, it is to be found within the EEC.”  She concluded her letter with 
a call for Britons to open their eyes to reality: “There is no [time] now for empire 
building mythology and narrow-minded nationalism; we are unable to go it alone… 
united [with Europe] we will have more influence and can press for better conditions.”6  
Tyler’s comments demonstrated a self-awareness that did not seem to exist in 1967.  In 
identifying and denouncing a British “mythology,” Tyler consciously recognized the 
influence of history on past EEC debates and sought to excise it from the present.  
Michael Steel picked up on this same thread in a different letter when he wrote:  “It is a 
destructive mixture of pride and possessiveness which makes it difficult for a people 
with a history like ours to make any compromise with other nations for the common 
good.”7  Not every pro-Europe letter-writer grappled with historical memory so directly, 
but even those who did not helped to shift Britain’s relationship with its past by 
implicitly embracing the new narrative. 
 Tyler’s letter featured another common argument: that the EEC was a reality 
whether Britain liked it or not, and that the only way for Britain to influence its policies 
was from the inside.  “We know that at present the EEC is far from perfect,” wrote T. H. 
Fowler of Redditch.  “Could we not help to shape its future development and help mould 
both the political and economic ideals?  We shan’t do so by remaining in isolation.”8  
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Tyler called for Britons to be proactive in changing the EEC to better suit their needs, 
rather than being reactive and insular by quitting the EEC. 
Arguments such as these took the resignation exhibited in letters above and made 
it into something constructive.  Accepting a smaller world role did not mean abandoning 
all influence on the world, these writers argued.  To the contrary, by working on a 
smaller, more realistic scale, Britain could be more effective in pursuing its world 
interests than it had been since before World War II.  Bristol’s Betty Letts made this 
exact point when she wrote: “What Britain has lost in her Empire she can regain as a 
dominant and respected influence in Europe, and see her humanitarian policies applied 
world wide.”9  Alan Lawson, an insurance broker, went straight to the heart of this line 
of argument in a Birmingham Post column called “The Post Six,” in which the Post 
asked six “regular” people to give their views on the referendum each week for the 
month leading up to the vote.  “We have lost an empire, and for the last thirty years we 
have been looking for a role in the world.  I wonder if this is it,” he opined.10 
Lawson spoke for many, but not for all.  Peter Hollingsworth, in a letter printed 
on April 14, launched a direct attack on the argument that Britain must accept its 
dependence on other nations.  “We have always been a small collection of islands,” he 
wrote.  “We thrive when the odds appear against us…  I am confident the British people 
will choose to stay independent.”11  Lawson’s argument for “independence” was echoed 
by many.  D. A. Gordon wrote: “The referendum is an opportunity to recall our 
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independence and to make a start to regain our self respect.”12  Gordon’s tying together 
of “independence” and “self-respect” is important.  The link between British 
international superiority and Britons’ personal sense of meaning – so present in the 
1967 debate – was still alive and well for at least some voters in the 1975 referendum. 
For many letter-writers, British independence and self-respect were so closely 
tied that they felt a deep sense of betrayal and shame toward their country for steering 
them into the EEC in the first place.  “If we are not man enough to put our house in 
order alone,” wrote Richard Elliott, “we will forever bow our heads in shame as the 
white beggar of Europe.”13  Elliott wanted Britain to work out its problems alone before 
it joined with any international agreement, EEC or otherwise.  To do anything else 
would be to accept charity – in Elliott’s reckoning, something of which Britons should be 
ashamed. 
The “independence” argument did not go unchallenged.  Some, such as Perry 
Barr’s A. Crossley, turned the anti-marketeers’ narrative of British “toughness” against 
them.  To the anti-marketeers, Britain had no need for Europe, such was the toughness 
of its inner bulldog.  Crossley, however, argued that that same bulldog demanded that 
Britain test its mettle by competing with Europe in the EEC.  “Are we so spineless, so 
lacking in our ability to compete that we must run away from Europe and take refuge 
behind a tariff wall?” he asked.14  Pro-marketeers also commonly refuted the 
“independence” argument by responding that independence went hand-in-hand with a 
continued downward spiral.  A perfect example of this line of thinking came from Peter 
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Corrigan, who wrote: “If we came out of the Common Market we would be ‘independent’ 
– to govern a siege economy and a steadily decreasing standard of living.  Would those 
who died in two world wars and those who love their country say this is a price they 
would pay for ‘independence’?”15  Corrigan’s letter not only refuted the “toughness” 
narrative, but challenged the anti-marketeers’ control over what had long been their 
exclusive territory: the legacy of World War II. 
The Battle for World War II 
 The legacy of World War II, once a unifying national myth, was contested in 1975.  
For many, the wounds were still sore and trusting Europe still impossible.  Councillor 
Richard Reynolds of Wolverhampton was one such individual.  “Let the pro-marketeers 
be in no doubt that Germany will be the predominant nation in the EEC,” he wrote.  
“Why should we be defeated by them now, by back-door methods, when so much blood 
was shed to defeat the regime that ruled in that country thirty years ago?”16  S. T. 
Perrens made a slightly different argument.  Rather than worry about German 
domination, Perrens expressed a distaste for French ambition.  Nevertheless, the 
language was still colored by World War II: “…one thing people seem to have forgotten.  
If it had not been for Britain in 1940 there would not have been a France…  They owe us 
their existence and we should not allow France to dictate to us what we shall do or not 
do.”17 
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 To these writers, the battles of World War II were still taking place.  Britain was 
still the savior of Europe, and Germany was still on the march.  An anonymous writer to 
the Liverpool Daily Post warned that the EEC represented “a great peril… [another] 
invasion of Europe.”18  However, while this view was the norm in 1967, in 1975 it 
appeared with much less frequency.  Opinions such as the following were more 
common: “Those of us who recall the state of post war Europe require no other reason 
for pushing towards unity in a continent which tore itself to pieces with sickening 
regularity.  For behind the European aspirations of the 1970s lie the ruins of the 1940s 
and the determination that nothing like the events of 1939 to 1945 shall ever occur 
again.”19  In this letter and those like it, the pro-marketeers set out to reclaim the legacy 
of World War II for the European integration movement, and for at least the months 
leading up to the 1975 referendum they were largely successful. 
 Pro-marketeers did not stop at reclaiming World War II; they often went much 
further back in British history in order to establish a narrative in which European 
integration was the next phase of an ongoing process.  Two prime examples are the 
letters of L. W. Wilson of Edgbaston and G. F. Elvins of Birmingham.  Wilson wrote: 
…we should remember that this country was once made up of seven separate kingdoms…  
Yet who could now seriously wish that the seven kingdoms were still in existence 
carrying on their recurring wars against each other instead of football and cricket 
contests between the counties.  Will not future generations wonder for the same reason 
how we ever hesitated to remain part of the United States of Europe?20 
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On a similar note, Elvins argued that “the basic reason for remaining in the EEC is one 
of historic evolution which should not be impeded…  One combines first with one’s 
neighbours, then as a group with similar groups, until eventually the whole world is 
one.”21  These letters were idealistic and likely not representative of the larger 
population, but they show just how much Britain’s history was being contested in the 
1975 debate.  The anti-marketeers went sometimes back just as far into Britain’s past, as 
in the case of one writer who asserted that the Magna Carta would be “mangled into 
obscurity” by the EEC.22 
History was the battleground, and for the three months of 1975 it was in flux.  
Britons were about to vote on a new future, and in doing so they were faced with 
forming a new narrative of their past.  History, however, was not the only field being 
contested. 
Sovereignty and Constitutionality 
In the 1975 referendum debate, the pro-marketeers did not refute their 
opposition’s claim that joining the EEC meant sacrificing British sovereignty; rather, 
they countered that the referendum was doing the exact same thing.   A version of the 
basic anti-marketeer talking point can be found in a letter by one Alan Meadowcroft: “If 
we become members of the federal state to be made from the EEC, we will have 
superimposed on our monarchial constitution a European presidential system.  The 
Queen will become the mere subject of a European president…  Every part of our 
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constitution will be debased if the European entanglement continues.”23  The common 
pro-marketeer response, as put forth in an editorial that expressed the official opinion of 
the Evening Post:  “On loss of sovereignty by our Parliament we agree that there must 
be some give, as in any partnership, but would be more impressed by those who are 
trying to scare us about it if they were not led by precisely those who are weakening 
Parliament by foisting a referendum on us.”24  From those foundational points, the 
debate took on many different permutations. 
J. J. York of Sutton Coldfield also expressed the issue clearly:  
It would appear that many anti-Marketeers are terrified of a loss of sovereignty caused 
by our continuing membership of the EEC.  However, it would also seem that these 
people are the strongest supporters of that constitutional disaster, the referendum, 
which is, by its very existence, a far greater loss of sovereignty, should the result be held 
as binding on Parliament as most anti-Marketeers wish.25 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the answer to the question of whether the 
referendum would be binding was both yes and no.  As a matter of law, Wilson conceded 
that it would not be constitutionally binding.  Nevertheless, he declared that it as a 
matter of principal, the Government would accept the peoples’ choice.  Thus, it was de 
facto binding.  Given Britain’s unwritten constitution, the distinction was not much 
more than a matter of rhetoric. 
Many, both pro and anti-marketeers, objected to the referendum not simply on 
constitutional grounds, but because they felt that the public did not know enough about 
the issues at stake.  “Ordinary people are not capable of assessing the intricacies of the 
economic problems involved,” wrote a Hinckley resident.  “The majority of people do 
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not wish to have the referendum because these are matters which should be left to 
Parliament.”26    Other writers took a different tack, arguing that sovereignty was no use 
if Britain was not powerful enough to wield it.  One Briton asked: “What is sovereignty 
without power or dominion?  …I don’t think we shall be important outside [Europe], 
because we are weak and divided – and what use would our national sovereignty be 
then?”27  This writer would preferred to have seen a powerful Britain capable of exerting 
its influence on the world than a weak Britain that preserved its national sovereignty but 
faded into international obscurity.  The recurring appearance of this pragmatic 
approach to sovereignty demonstrated the lengths to which some Britons were willing to 
go find a new future for their struggling country.  To return Britain to relevance, they 
were consciously willing to bring down everything that conventionally defined Britain. 
The anti-marketeers, in rebuttal, argued that though the referendum was a 
violation of Parliamentary sovereignty, it was nevertheless the lesser of two evils.  G. E. 
Lillywhite of Cheltenham took this tack in a letter from April 17:  “[Politicians] must 
again inform and consult their electors as they should always have done, but have now 
ceased to do…  Until we return to this closer liaison, which should be the normal 
process, to talk of constitutional methods and democratic institutions is hypocrisy.”28  
For Lillywhite, the ideal of Parliamentary sovereignty was already lost when Parliament 
grew out of touch with the population.  The referendum was merely an attempt to force 
Parliament to once again listen to the people.  Gerald Glynn of Erdington expressed the 
same sentiment in a sly letter that evoked English satirist W. S. Gilbert:  “Gilbert would 
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have loved that – [politicians] trying to persuade us that a course of action [the 
referendum] ‘affronts Parliamentary sovereignty’ when that precise action is, in fact, the 
only means left to the people of this country to ensure a continuance of that 
sovereignty.”29 
In fighting over sovereignty in 1975, both sides of the debate recognized that this 
moment was a turning point for traditional British notions of Parliamentary 
sovereignty.  Either Britain’s first national public referendum would overrule Parliament 
and make the term “Parliamentary sovereignty” meaningless, or Britain would remain 
in the EEC and forfeit an unforeseeable degree of its national independence.  Either 
way, there was no going back, but such was the enormity of the choice that Britons had 
to make.  Britain would change; it was simply a matter of how.   
In the months leading up to the 1975 referendum, Britons grappled with their 
past as a means of determining their future.  They contested the nature of British 
independence and British toughness; they contested the legacy of World War II; they 
contested what it meant to be British.  Ultimately, after hundreds of pages of words had 
been poured onto the pages of newspapers across the country, Britain’s decades-long 
identity crisis came down to a single vote.  By a majority of 67.2%, Britons voted in favor 
of a new European identity, and in doing so a break from their past. 
In 1975, Britons overcame a national identity that had held sway on British 
politics since World War II.  As their own words show, they did this by marshaling their 
history in order to create a new narrative of their past.  History is not a set of facts; it is 
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the connective tissue between those facts that gives them shape and tells a story.  By 
telling a different story, Britons suggested a different ending.  Their achievement did not 
mark the end of Britain’s struggle to define itself.  Rather, it demonstrated that national 
identity is in a state of flux, and when the moment is right it can be shifted in ways that 
change how a state behaves.  Harold Wilson’s decision to call the bluff of Parliamentary 
sovereignty made this possible in Britain.  No matter how old and storied a nation’s 





The Song Remains the Same 
The British Empire may have vanished from the map, but it has not entirely vanished from the 
mind. 
-David Cannadine, 2001 
______________________________ 
 In the autumn of 2011, Sir Salman Rushdie delivered a convocation lecture at 
Oberlin College.  In that speech, he expounded upon an axiom credited to Heraclitus: 
“character is destiny.”  The truth of that statement, Rushdie argued, could be illustrated 
by Charles Schultz’s Peanuts gang – specifically, Lucy’s nasty habit of pulling the 
football away from Charlie Brown every time that he moves in for a kick.  Charlie 
inevitably tumbles through the air and hurts himself, yet time and again he remains 
hopeful that this will be the moment that he finally kicks the ball.  Yet, “if Charlie Brown 
successfully kicks the football,” Sir Rushdie said, “he ceases to be Charlie Brown.”  If 
Charlie Brown’s role in the narrative changes, the character would fundamentally 
change with it.  He would no longer be recognizable to his audience, his friends, or 
himself.  If his function changed, he would lose his identity.  Thankfully, Schultz never 
let such a thing happen. 
 But what would happen if, despite Sir Rushdie’s warning, Charlie Brown were to 
kick that football?  Charlie gets lucky and makes contact.  The football goes flying.  He 
would no longer be “Charlie Brown,” so who would this new person be?  How does that 
person react?  What does that person become?  Charlie Brown’s hypothetical dilemma is 
a stand-in for any individual or collective with a distinct identity that faces a moment of 




reinvention or descent into irrelevance.  It is a question faced by every workaholic who 
retires or is let go, every obsessive parent whose children move away, and every long-
term spouse who unwillingly faces divorce.  It was also a question that faced the people 
of Great Britain after World War II, though they did not admit it for some time. 
 In many ways, however, Charlie Brown’s football is still in the air.  Britons voted 
to stay in the EEC in 1975, and in doing so showed that in that moment they had broken 
from their past and adopted a new national identity closer to Europe.  They achieved 
this enormous feat by marshaling their history, just as the opponents of the EEC 
successfully did in 1967.  Britons wrested their history from the grasp of Churchill’s 
“Finest Hour” narrative and, following Harold Wilson’s lead, forged a new narrative in 
which Britain was simply entering the next phase of the inevitable process of 
integration.  By doing this, Britons proved that though history holds enormous influence 
on a nation’s identity, it is not set in stone.  National narratives can be contested; 
national identities can be changed.  However, this state of constant flux cuts both ways.  
Shifts in national identity can be undone just as surely as they can be made.  The 1975 
Referendum did not resolve Britain’s identity crisis; it merely marked a moment of 
momentary consensus. 
 While doing research for this thesis in London during the month of January 
2012, I was surprised to find how many of the themes of my research still resonated in 
today’s Britain.  My time in London coincided with a tense moment in the Eurozone 
crisis that began in 2011, and the language with which Londoners spoke of the European 
Union was remarkably similar to the language used in 1967.  One cabbie I spoke to 




Germany as “German boots back on the march.”  Another referred to Britain’s 
membership in the EU as “nothing but sand being kicked in our face.”  British 
newspapers ran opinion pieces ruing the day that Britain joined the EEC.  The pieces 
that I read never once mentioned the 1975 referendum.  It seems that many modern 
Britons would rather not remember that they voted overwhelmingly in favor of EEC 
membership in 1975, for then they would have no one to blame for their current troubles 
but themselves. 
 In the end, many of the flashpoints of the 1967 and 1975 EEC debates proved 
artificial.  Charlie Brown kicked the football, but he remained Charlie Brown.  Britons 
feared that by joining the EEC they would forfeit the Commonwealth, but the 
Commonwealth’s political ties last to this day, though its economic ties have weakened.  
They were convinced that the Queen would become nothing more than a smiling 
figurehead, but EEC membership had no bearing on that inevitability.  They worried 
that Britain would become a subservient state in a federal Europe, but a half-century 
later the UK remains sovereign.  In fact, the greatest threat to the preservation of the UK 
as of this writing is the Scottish independence movement, which has secured a 
referendum to be held in 2014 that will determine whether Scotland will remain in the 
UK.  Considering that Great Britain was created by the union of England and Scotland in 
1707, if Scotland becomes independent it will no longer make sense to speak of British 
national identity at all.  The true danger to British national identity is fragmentation, not 
assimilation. 
 Britain’s identity crisis is unlikely to end any time soon.  The great achievement 




alternative narrative of their history, an alternative national identity, and an alternative 
vision of their future.  They gave themselves a choice, and that choice has continued to 
face them anew every day since.  As the Wilson Government constantly reminded voters 
in the lead-up to the referendum, the important thing is that the choice is in their hands 
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